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1. INTRODUCTION
The rise and development of ‘Coloured’ labour 
relations and political organisations form the 
central theme of this study. These two areas of 
South African contemporary history have re­
ceived comparatively little attention for a num­
ber of reasons. Not the least of these is the 
controversial issue of whether or not it is justifi­
able or accurate to treat ‘Coloureds’ as a separ­
ate and identifiable group apart from the black 
majority. The term ‘Coloured’ as used in the 
South African context refers to those people 
often described in other societies as of mixed 
race, mulattos or half-castes. Within this study 
the term ‘Coloured with a capital C and here­
after without apostrophes is used to avoid con­
fusion with ‘coloured1 meaning black. Black is 
used in the general sense of all those people not 
being White.
The impact of organized Coloured politics, how­
ever, has been greater than their minority status 
would suggest, especially in the Cape, and in par­
ticular in the Western Cape, where most of the 
people described as Coloured live. When Col­
oured political mobilization started in the 1890’s, 
it centered in Cape Town. The founding of the 
first successful Coloured political movement, 
the African Political Organization (APO), 
marked the start of successful black political mo­
bilization on a national scale in South Africa. 
Other Coloured organisations which emerged 
after the APO made important contributions to 
the tactics and ideologies of Black political 
leaders. Coloured intellectuals in the 1940’s pro­
pagated the principle of non-collaboration with 
segregatory political institutions, implemented 
through the tactic of the boycott, a strategy em­
ployed to good effect by contemporary Black or­
ganisations. This study is divided into three main 
sections. Chapters 1 and 2 trace the origins of the 
labour history in which past and present day de­
velopments in the industrial relations system can
be viewed in relation to the political, industrial 
and economic systems that have evolved within 
South Africa since the occupation of the West­
ern Cape by the Dutch in 1652. The initial con­
tact betw een these E uropeans and the 
indigenous inhabitants of the Cape developed a 
relationship which determined the pattern of in­
teraction between Black and White South Afri­
cans the major traces of which have still 
remained until today. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 deal 
with the early history of the Coloured people, 
their industrial and political organisations prior 
to the watershed year of South African Indus­
trial Relations, 1979, whereafter a more gener­
alised view is adopted in order to trace the broad 
trends which have emerged with the new labour 
dispensation and its industrial enfranchisement 
of the Black worker. The remaining chapters 
concentrate on Coloured participation within 
the Industrial and Political arenas, particularly 
in the Western Cape, and offer substantiation 
for the postulate of a new political grouping 
based on socialist principles and having a simi­
lar trend in terms of its origins to that of the Brit­
ish Labour Party at its birth at the turn of this 
century. It is concluded that this grouping would 
be a natural home for the ‘stateless’ Coloured, 
and ideologically and politically would offer co­
herence and structure to the disparate groupings 
within the United Democratic Front (UDF) and 
form the most potential, Western Cape based 
political party ‘in waiting
2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC 
INTERACTION AND CONFLICT
From the time that tentative contact between 
Black and White in South Africa was established 
as a permanent and constant feature of society, 
the relationship has been one of conflict arising 
from the scarcity of resources important to the 
colonists and the Bantu-speaking population 
alike. Conflict was at the core of the relationship 
that developed and was the pivot of the new so­
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ciety that emerged.
“The development o f white society was profound­
ly influenced by its relations with slaves, Hotten­
tots, . . .  and the Bantu. The tme history of South 
African colonization describes the growth, not of 
a settlement of Europeans, but of a totally new and 
unique society of different races and colours and 
cultural attainments, fashioned by conflict o f 
racial heredity and the opposition of unequal so­
cial groups.” (De Kiewiet, 1967: p.49)
The social system which developed under White 
rule owes much to the early relationships be­
tween the European colonists and the aboriginal 
inhabitants of the Cape Colony, the profound 
significance of which lies . .in the precedents 
that were set for the white man’s relations with the 
Bantu” (Keppel-Jones: 1975, p.37) and the de­
velopment of a coercive labour system and the 
attitudes of white superiority which stemmed 
from .. the slave owning traditions of the West­
ern Cape” (Muller, 1981: pp. 153-154). Right 
from the beginning of European colonisation of 
the Cape, extensive farming practices were en­
couraged by the availability of plentiful land. 
However, bands of nomadic Khoikhoi, deci­
mated by periodic outbreaks of warfare and 
smallpox, were soon reduced to a landless ser­
vant class who, even when willing to work, be­
came unable to “. . . satisfy the demands of the 
colonists for labour”. (Keppel-Jones, 1975: p.37) 
Soon after what proved to be a permanent occu­
pation of the Cape by Europeans, Van Riebeeck 
was prompted by the extreme scarcity of labour 
at the Cape to ask the Dutch East India Com­
pany to support the settlers by providing slaves 
“. . .  to place them the sooner on their legs." (Wil­
son and Thompson, 1969: p.194) The depend­
ence of the settlers on slaves and the large-scale 
use thereof “. . . had long -lasting effects on the 
occupational distribution of whites. They left la­
bour largely in the hands of their slaves and tended 
to become specialist overseers, with participation
in economic life limited to directing and organiz­
ing their employees (slaves) in their enterprises”. 
(Wilson and Thompson, 1969: p.194)
For the European, manual labour gradually as­
sumed a position of social inferiority, and this, 
together with the relative cheapness of slave la­
bour, “.. .encouraged their widespread utilization 
throughout the economy o f the developing col­
ony”. (Muller, 1981: pp 153-154) The use of slave 
labour for all menial and unskilled work had a 
profound effect on the socio-economic develop­
ment of the country. “ The introduction of slaves 
automatically closed the doors to unskilled Euro­
pean workers. . .”, retarded technical develop­
ment, and introduced “. . .  a tradition o f 
dependence on cheap but ineffective labour. . 
(Hobart, 1976: p.2) which in turn encouraged 
the development of a labour-intensive economy 
in the colony. The social and economic conse­
quences of the early development of unskilled- 
labour which was almost exclusively non White 
were at the heart of the relationship which later 
developed between the White frontier farmer 
and the Black pastoralists on the Eastern Fron­
tier.
The first fleeting contact between Black and 
White occured in the Eastern Cape in the early 
years of the eighteenth century when a party of 
Whites clashed with Xhosa tribesmen in 1702. 
Sporadic contact gave w;ay to almost constant 
contact toward the end of the century. Although 
frequent attempts were made to apply a policy 
of non-intercourse between Black and White, in­
teraction continued in an atmosphere of increas­
ing tension, punctuated by desperate attempts to 
impose total segregation. It was on the Eastern 
Cape frontier “. . . that the policies which have 
had (such) a profound influence on Southern A f­
rica were first formulated and applied” (Muller, 
1981: p.154) policies which subsequently lead to 
the creation of .. a new society and the estab­
lishment of new economic and social bonds.” (De
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Kiewiet, 1967: p.49)
The Dutch East India Company had, during the 
formative years of the Cape Colony, recognized 
the cultural and religious division between the 
indigenous inhabitants and the settlers; initially, 
relations were circumscribed by a religious di­
chotomy between Christian and heathen. Event­
ually this divide was, in simple terms, between 
White and Black, rather than between Christian 
and heathen, (Legassick, 1978: p.8) and the 
traditional policy of non-intercourse was sub­
sequently applied on the Eastern Frontier. The 
frontier conflict is of fundamental importance to 
our knowledge of the present relationship that 
exists between the racial groups in South Africa, 
for:
“Three centuries of Black -  White contact.. .  have 
produced . . .  (an) imbalance of power between 
(the) groups, resulting in the subordination of the 
Black population and the inequitable distribution 
of economic and political resources.” (Savage, 
1975: p.281)
The policies formulated at the Cape which re­
stricted contact between the races, even to the 
extent of forbidding Hottentots entry to the 
house of White settlers, was continued on the 
frontier, but proved to be just as futile to imple­
ment as they had in Cape Town. “All efforts to 
keep the races apart failing because of the mutual 
desire to trade.” (Hobart, 1976: p.19) The new 
English Governor made renewed attempts to 
impose separation and issued proclamations in 
1797 and 1798 which required that White inhabi­
tants discharge all Black servants within a peri­
od of 12 months. Both proclamations had little 
effect, and Blacks continued to reside on the 
‘White' side of the Fish River. In 1803, the Cape 
was again briefly governed by the Batavian Re­
public and it immediately set about introducing 
further controls on relations with the Blacks. 
Janssen’s proclamations differed, however: “In­
stead of ordering the discharge of all kaffir ser­
vants. . as his English predecessor had done, 
he made an exception .. of those who had been 
employed for more than a year-an indication that 
the breakdown of complete segregation was re­
alised.” (Robertson, 1934: p.408) Like former 
proclamations, Janssen’s had little or no effect; 
White and Black continued to mix in the Zwu- 
veld region and White farmers continued to em­
ploy Xhosa tribesmen.
In 1812, a fresh attempt was made by the British 
authorities to make the Fish River the dividing 
line between Black and White. This endeavor 
proved more successful, but was followed in 
1817 by a slight relaxation in policy, which later, 
in 1819, led to renewed imposition of segrega­
tion and the establishment of a neutral belt be­
tween the Fish River and the Keiskamma. This 
attempt to keep the area empty of both Black 
and White settlers (Van der Horst, 1971: pp lb- 
17) resulted in loss of land by the Blacks and the 
denial of any economic contact with the Whites. 
(Keppel-Jones, 1975: p.37) However, . . the 
very land hunger o f these frontiersmen, their indif­
ference to African land rights and land needs, had 
deprived non-Whites of the possibility of subsist­
ence on the land and made inevitable . . . econ­
omic integration.” (Legasick, 1978: p.2)
The neutral belt gradually filled up as farmers 
increased their demands for land and labour, 
and the policy of geographical separation and 
‘non-intercourse’ with Blacks was subject to 
modification. In 1828, Blacks were allowed to 
enter the Colony as servants, but were . . re­
garded as foreigners, temporary visitors who were 
useful while they worked, but whose rightful place 
was outside.” (Van der Horst, 1971: p.16) Passes 
were issued to control the admission of Blacks 
to the Colony.
Disputes over the right to use land continued, 
and despite recurrent hostilities, the employ­
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ment of Blacks continued, although some at­
tempts were still made by the British, . .to 
maintain a policy o f separation.” (Van der Horst, 
1971: p.16) Futher outbreaks culminated in the 
War of the Axe (1846-1847), and the British ad­
ministration abondoned its policy of separation 
along the old frontier. The territory up to the Kei 
River was annexed and the new dependency of 
British Kaffraria was formed in the country be­
tween the Keiskamma and Kei Rivers. The cre­
ation of British Kaffraria “. . . ended the long 
sustained attempt to maintain territorial segrega­
tion along the line o f a river, and so began the at­
tempt to rule Black and White as inhabitants of 
one country.” (Walker, 1976: p.19)
Assimilation now began in earnest; White set­
tlers were moved into British Kaffraria, making 
further inroads into the traditional African 
Economy which required a supply of land. “As 
their land shrank. . . ”, the result of further white 
expansion which continued in piecemeal fashion 
until Pondoland was annexed in 1894, “.. .Xhosa 
were driven into still closer association with 
Whites. The one commodity they had to sell was 
their labour.” (Wilson & Thompson, 1969: p.256) 
The introduction of Whites into territory which 
had previously been held by Black farmers, and 
in which Blacks remained in large numbers and 
in close proximity to Whites, created a ready 
supply of labour close at hand. (Van der Horst, 
1971: pp 16-17) “The presence o f small blocks of 
Natives in close proximity to potential European 
employers removes the hindrance which distance 
imposes on the supply o f labour.” (Van der Horst, 
1971: p.16)
The British expected that their policy would in­
duce the Blacks ‘to recognise common interests' 
and become ‘useful servants' who would contrib­
ute to the wealth of the Colony. (Van der Horst, 
1971: p.17) To this end, Sir George Grey intro­
duced an egalatarian system of public works 
which would “. . . encourange the Natives to de­
velop European wants.” (Van der Horst, 1971: 
P-17)
The economic contact which emerged from the 
head-on collision of Black and White on the Eas­
tern Cape frontier was dominated by the bitter 
conflict over land, and ill-developed as a result 
of the incompatible desires of the protagonists : 
Whites supported separation on the one hand 
and economic interaction on the other; for their 
part, the Xhosa “... wanted both the goods of civi­
lization and to maintain traditional custom.” 
(Wilson & Thompson, 1969: p.271) This discord 
was to persist into the next century when the in­
compatibility between social and political segre­
gation and the employment of Blacks was to 
dominate events on the highveld. (Wilson & 
Thompson, 1969: p.271)
3. INDUSTRIAL SEGREGATION: THE 
EVOLUTION OF A POLICY
The development of the mining industry and 
growth of satellite manufacturing concerns cre­
ated a demand for labour which neither the 
black peoples nor the much smaller White popu­
lation were able to satisfy. Labour had been in 
short supply since the early days of White settle­
ment in the Cape which had led to the introduc­
tion of slavery. (Hobart, 1976: p .l l ). This had 
important consequences, for the introduction of 
slaves automatically closed the doors to un­
skilled European workers.
The critical shortage was for skilled labour, and 
this had to be imported from Britain and, to a 
lesser extent, other European countries. The de­
mand for unskilled labour was supplied by 
Blacks. The importation of skilled White labour 
reinforced the division between White and 
Black, the master/servant relationship having 
been firmly established in South African society 
prior to the establishment of industrialization.
This racial segmentation in which large numbers
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of Black workers were relegated to unskilled em­
ployment . . fitted conveniently into the tradi­
tional pattern o f society, and the notion that Write 
men should undertake the administrative, super­
visory and skilled occupations, while Blacks 
should supply the unskilled labour.. . ” (Hobart, 
1976: p.12) was the cause of later social and in­
dustrial conflict based on skill and race, and was 
to have profound and far reaching effects on the 
development of labour policy in South Africa. 
What was essentially a socio-economic or class 
distinction between different levels of workers 
had coincided with a racial division.
The race/skill split was coincidental in its origin. 
Once having been established, “... it was then re­
inforced by the wage gap along the racial division 
. . (Williams, 1979: p.65) Payment of high 
wages to skilled white workers arose from the 
necessity for the mining companies to compete 
for skilled labour. Although this division was the 
result of the extreme scarcity of skilled workers, 
“. . .  the distinction between skilled and unskilled 
soon became to be more or less identified with the 
distinction between the races and the operation of 
the market forces soon came in some measure to 
be replaced by the convention that the white man’s 
wage was five to ten times the wage of a black 
m a n ” (C ontem porary  Southern African 
Studies, 1978: p.80)
The continually increasing cost of labour had in­
duced the mine owners to use indentured 
Chinese labour, a policy which met with initial 
opposition from White labour, but was event­
ually given support following the enactment of 
legislation (the Transvaal Labour Importation 
Ordinance) which prohibited Chinese being em­
ployed in skilled occupations. Conflict on the 
mines centred .. almost exclusively on the ques­
tion o f cheap labour and the relationship between 
skilledandunskilled” (De Kiewiet, 1967: pp274- 
275), and it was almost inevitable that confron­
tation between ‘White labour’ and capital would
arise. A proposal by the mine owners that Black 
and Chinese labourers should be allowed to per­
form skilled work brought White mine workers 
out on strike in 1907 in an attempt to protect, and 
thus preserve, their position of privilege. Further 
strikes occurred in 1913, 1914, 1917 and 1922 
consequent to renewed attempts by the mine 
owners to introduce cheap black labour into 
skilled positions. Opposition to Black advance­
ment confirmed the artisans craft unions in their 
racial exclusiveness.
Trade union leadership during the early years of 
the twenties was closely allied to political leader­
ship, as was fairly obvious during the great 1922 
strike.
In the general election of 1924, labour involve­
ment in the political arena manifested itself in 
the form of a pact between the Labour Party and 
the Afrikaner National Party. White workers 
readily supported the pact, being in broad agree­
ment with an organisation that was an amalga­
mation of a conservative labour party and a 
conservative cultural and racial group, (Keppel- 
Jones, 1975, p.162) and were successful in de­
feating the South African Party.
Following the strike of 1922, organised White la­
bour had made further demands for the protec­
tion of White workers, both in the mines and the 
expanding manufacturing industry. After its 
electoral victory, the Labour/Nationalist coali­
tion immediately set about the implementation 
of a ‘civilized labour’ policy, and introduced be­
tween the years 1924 and 1926 legislation which 
was not only to determine the pattern for the fu­
ture of a ‘protective’ system of labour relations, 
but would also provide the means by which 
White labour could be firmly allied with the gov­
ernment of the country.
The Industrial Conciliation Act was passed dur­
ing the last days of the Smuts Government as an 
attempt .. to appease white artisans and regain
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electoral support following his military interven- 
tion during the Rand Rebellion. . .” (Keppel- 
Jones, 1975: p.163) and was of fundamental 
importance in determining future labour policy, 
which together with the Wages Act, No. 27 of 
1925, and the Mines and Works Amendment 
Act, No. 25 of 1926 legally entrenched the con­
cept of White labour supremacy.
The aim of the Act was the establishment of a 
machinery for collective bargaining and the 
prevention and settlement of disputes between 
employees and employers, thus providing a 
statutory framework by which organised labour 
and employers could regulate their relationship. 
The exclusion of the majority of African workers 
from the provisions of the Act “..  . formed part 
of the overall policy of providing preferential em­
ployment opportunities to white workers.. .” and 
the Act consequently “. . .  acquired the character 
of a strong protective device fo r ... white workers. ” 
(Natrass, 1981: p.63)
The Wage Act of 1925 created the machinery for 
establishing minimum wages and conditions of 
employment for unorganised workers who were 
unable to participate in the collective bargaining 
system provided by the Industrial Conciliation 
Act. Provision was also made for the settlement 
of disputes.
In the Wage Act, no distinction was made be­
tween Black and White workers, but Wage 
Boards formed in terms of the Act were, in most 
instances, unable to recommend high wages 
which were in accordance with civilized stand­
ards of living; high wages would reduce the de­
mand for White workers. (Keppel-Jones, 1975: 
pp 162-163) The consequence was that the Wage 
Act catered mainly for the needs of unorganised 
White labour, being unable to provide for Black 
workers because of the requirement in this Act 
to recommend civilized wages.
The perceived threat from other race groups to
security of employment and positions of privi­
lege enjoyed by White workers was the fun­
damental reason for the introduction of a 
statutory ‘colour bar’ into the mining industry. 
The Pact Government, by means of the amended 
Mines and Works Act, deliberately introduced 
artificial forms of protection for White workers.
Threats to White jobs had been responsible for 
the passage of the original Mines and Works Act 
in 1911 and the legislation of the ’colour bar’ af­
forded protection which skill alone was unable 
to do. The Mines and Works Amendment Act of 
1926 “. . .  re-established the chief statutory support 
of the colour bar in mining” (Welsh,1971: p.187).
This solved the problem of protection for skilled 
workers, as the principle of retaining skilled oc­
cupations for Whites in the mines could be ex­
tended to other industries, but the main problem 
which the Pact had to face was a solution to the 
‘poor white problem’. (Keppel-Jones, 1975: 
p.163)
Black migration to the towns was accompanied 
by a migration of Whites. The number of W hites 
who were unable to live on the land had been 
growing since the latter part of the nineteenth 
century, but assumed serious proportions fol­
lowing the devastating effects of the Boer War. 
Drought and hopelessly inefficient farming 
methods added to the plight of poor W'hites, and 
forced them out of the rural areas to the town. 
Further problems awaited the tide of unedu­
cated White work-seekers in the towns.
The Black,White skill differential, reinforced by 
discriminatory labour legislation, relegated 
Black workers to the status of ‘permanent la­
bourers’. The White migrants, reduced by pov­
erty to the economic level of the black labourer, 
usually poorly educated and unsophisticated, 
were “. . .  the victims of more than poverty and ig­
norance. In the towns, as in the country>, many 
were improvident, irresponsible (and) indolent. .
. Incapable of skilled labour, their approach to un­
skilled labour was often grudging and biased. 
Their race was their superiority over the natives, 
and to do manual labour conflicted with the dig­
nity conferred upon them by their race”. (Keppel- 
Jones, 1975: p.161)
Unemployment amongst poor Whites increased 
throughout the first quarter of the twentieth cen­
tury and was aggravated by the constantly in­
creasing influx of Blacks into the urban areas. 
The White migrant found himself as a competi­
tor for unskilled work with Black people, who 
.. were prepared to accept the jobs at a wage that 
was . . .  lower than the wage needed to sustain a 
White way of life’” (Natrass, 1981: p.65). The 
Pact Government’s ’civilised labour’ policy was 
the means with which the poor White problem 
was to be solved . .  by introducing Europeans 
to unskilled labour”. (Hobart, 1976: p.12) The 
Labour/Nationalist Pact had promised action to 
reduce the poverty and hardship experienced by 
the newly urbanised Whites . . partly because 
of the threat to so-called ’civilised standards’ and 
partly through fear of the real possibility o f soli­
darity amongworkers ofall races.” (Hobart, 1976: 
P-24)
Hertzog took immediate action to implement 
schemes to provide employment for unskilled 
Whites. In most cases, this meant that Black wor­
kers were often replaced by poor Whites who 
then were paid ‘White’ wages. State institutions 
such as the railways provided the bulk of the jobs 
which were taken by poor Whites and sanctions 
were implemented by the Government against 
those firms which retained Black workers in 
preference to Whites.
4. THE COLOURED PEOPLE OF THE 
WESTERN CAPE
The expression ‘a house divided against itself is 
more applicable to South Africa than it may be 
to any other country. Disreali’s ‘two nations’
become in South Africa at least five; and these 
are rent by subdivision and internal dissension. 
The history of South Africa is the story of strife 
between the groups composing the political 
union. There is no single instance where the 
population of South Africa was united during a 
great crisis.
Economically, everything that was achieved in 
terms of agriculture, in mining and in transport 
was the result of White skills, capital and organi­
sation combined with Black labour. The differ­
ent ‘nations’ combined to that extent, but the 
unity that was hopefully implied in the original 
title -  Union of South Africa -  remained that, a 
hope, as the divisions remained as obstacles to 
the real union.
A variety of different headings may be used to 
describe the people of a country. They may be 
described as ‘industrial’, ‘rural’, ‘agricultural or 
‘urban’, or according to geographical regions. 
Though the term is no longer in vogue, a popu­
lation can be divided into upper, middle and 
lower classes. Descriptions such as these might 
be safely applied to many countries in the First 
World without denying the essential unity of the 
people as a population. What social differences 
and distinctions there may be in the way of lan­
guage, of customs, of amusements are pic­
turesque survivals ra ther than essential 
differences.
In South Africa, the situation is different. One 
may indeed describe the population according 
to regions of classes or occupations; but it would 
be unrealistic not to subdivide these divisions 
into Whites, Coloureds, Asians and Blacks. In a 
sense all those who live in Cape Town maybe de­
scribed as the people of Cape Town and in this 
regard may share and enjoy the same climate 
and be subject to the same physical wants. But 
to regard this community as an expression of 
common citizenship is misleading. It may be ar­
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gued that what matters between human beings is 
not the differences, but the essential similarities. 
To ignore these differences in any account of 
South Africa and its peoples would be to de­
scribe things as they no doubt should be but not 
as they are in fact.
Preliminary results of the 1985 census put the 
Coloured population at 12.1% of the population. 
(Statistical News Release, 1986: p .ll) The dis­
tribution is such that the Coloured people con­
stitute 30% of the population of the Cape 
Peninsula and 87% of the population of the 
Cape Province. (Theron Commission, 1976)
Historians of the Coloured people have found 
them divided by ‘race, religion, even conditions of 
servitude’, describing them as a heterogeneous 
collection of individuals ‘lumped together for ad­
ministrative purposes’ by the white-supremacist 
state (Fredrickson, 1981: p.189). Coloured share 
White religion, culture and language, so much so 
that Marais declares that, ‘as distinct from the 
European’, a Coloured community ‘does not exist 
in any realistic interpretation of the tenn’. Similar­
ly, others have described the Coloureds as a 
’marginalised, resourceless, lower-class adjunct 
to the Cape Whites’, as ‘brown Afrikaners’ (Ma­
rais, 1939: p.257). Indeed, the two major govern­
ment commissions of inquiry into the Coloured 
people, in 1937 and 1976, both proved unable to 
agree on a definition of ‘Coloured’. If one de­
scribes a Coloured as someone of ’racially mixed 
stock’, they realised, one ran into the problem of 
how to tell where ‘Coloured’ ended and ‘Hdtite’ 
or ‘African ’ began, given the wide range of physi­
cal types amongst the Coloured people and the 
extent of misceganation since the arrival of the 
first white settlers.
Legislative attempts to define a ‘Coloured’ 
proved equally unsatisfactory and contradictory, 
the commissioners found. When the Nationalist 
government in 1950 enacted the cornerstone of
its policy, the Population ‘groups’, it applied an 
entirely arbitrary definition of ‘Coloured’. The 
Population Registration Act described a popu­
lation ‘group’ as something ‘prescribed and 
defined by the Govenor-General’, and for the Col­
oured and white ‘population groups’ it fell back 
in the last resort on physical appearance or 
‘general acceptance’ or both as the criteria. This 
makes the legislative definition a matter of opi­
nion rather than fact, and an opinion moreover 
with potential disastrous consequences for the 
life-chances of those classified ‘Coloured’ rather 
than ‘White’.
In the light of all this, it is not surprising that 
many, although not all, people classified as ‘Col­
oured’ today reject that categorisation. Not only 
does the term carry offensive and inaccurate 
undertones of illegitimacy, but to the politically 
conscious it represents an attempt by the state to 
divide blacks and simultaneously preserve white 
‘racial purity>’ by treating Coloureds as a separ­
ate, coherent and homogenous ‘race’ apart from 
both Africans and Whites, with a few more pri­
vileges than the former and much fewer that the 
latter. A recent book has as its sole aim the ob­
ject of exploding the ‘myth’ of a separate ‘Col­
oured identity’ (Van der Ross, 1979). Cohen, in 
his study of ethnicity, describes an ethnic group 
as ‘a collectivity of people who’ amongst other 
things, ‘share some patterns o f nonnative beha­
viour'. Some deny even that the Coloureds form 
a ‘group’. Michael Whisson, in attempting to as­
sess the validity of defining Coloureds as a 
group, concludes that given their obvious lack of 
’residential, economic, social or physical’ ho­
mogeneity, the legitimacy of defining them as a 
group rests ‘solely on the power of the state’ to en­
force it. The Coloureds, Whisson concludes, do 
not form even a ‘group’, but rather a ‘residual ca­
tegory of persons whose sole common feature is 
negatively defined' (Whisson, 1972: pp 2-8).
All this confronts the historian of Coloured poli­
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tics with both an empirical and an ethical dilem­
ma. To study Coloured history, one needs to 
know what a ‘Coloured’ is; yet to accept existing 
definitions of Coloureds is to accept implicitly, 
and thereby reinforce, the obviously arbitrarily 
imposed definitions of a state in the interests of 
White supremacy. The use of euphemisms such 
as ‘browns’ for Coloureds offers no solution. (Si­
mons, 1964). On the other hand, it is a historical 
fact that Coloured political organisations, such 
as the African Peoples Organisation (APO), did 
exist, and appealed specifically to Coloureds for 
support.
The solution to this dilemma, it is submitted, is 
to accept that Coloured identity is a White-im­
posed categorisation. But it is one that for a var­
iety of reasons came to be adopted by sections 
of those people so described. More specifically, 
an emerging Coloured elite gradually began, by 
the early 1900s, to use their imposed Coloured 
identity to mobilize others so described so as to 
advance their interest as a group. How this con­
stantly evolving process developed can be seen 
in the rise of Coloured political organisations at 
the Cape. Indeed, the central theme is that the 
tensions and ambiguities surrounding the issue 
of Coloured identity or ‘ethnicity’ have formed a 
major dynamic in the history and development 
of organised Coloured politics in South Africa.
The proliferation of studies in recent years of 
ethnicity or ‘neo-ethnicity’ has considerably 
clarified our understanding of this phenome- 
mon, helping for instance, to explain the rise of 
Afrikaner nationalism in South Africa. These 
studies show that ethnicity is not something 
static, primordial or genetically preordained. In­
stead, it is a changing social process, serving im­
portant psychological and emotional needs by 
instilling a sense of self-worth and belonging, as 
well as being a political process whereby groups 
of people seek to mobilise collectively to ad­
vance or defend their material interests within
the wider society. (Glazer and Moynihan, 1975: 
pp 309-348) All this finds its reflection in Col­
oured political mobilisation. It implies that eth­
nic identification can, if it does not directly serve 
the material and psychological needs of the in­
dividual, be abondoned for other forms of ident­
ification, such as class.
Ethnic allegiances, however, can develop an 
emotional or ideological dimension that takes on 
a life of its own, independent of purely material 
concerns. The important point is that there is 
nothing immutable or inevitable about ethnic 
identification. It is a voluntary process on the 
part of the individual. Ethnic mobilisation, in a 
state where ethnicity is used to determine de­
grees of access to state resources, constitutes a 
rational strategy in the competition for such re­
sources, not a false consciousness or an irra­
tional xenophobia. In addition, ethnic mobilisa­
tion provides important opportunities for pool­
ing resources for educational or economic ad­
vancem ent, and for recreation  and the 
socialisation of new members into the group. All 
these features are apparent in the rise and devel­
opment of Coloured political organisations in 
South Africa. Coloured political mobilisation, 
therefore, is closely linked to the rise of a sense 
of Coloured identity. (Adam, 1971: p.21)
Those people later described by the dominant 
white settlers as ‘Coloureds’ had emerged very 
early on after the arrival of the first settlers at the 
Cape of Good Hope in 1652. A continuing pro­
cess of absorption and miscegenation between 
European colonists, the remnants of the in­
digenous Khosian peoples of the Cape, and the 
East and West African Madagascan and East In­
dian slaves whom the colonists imported, pro­
duced over time a heterogeneous collectivity of 
‘people of colour in the colony. Acculturated by, 
but as a rule not absorbed into, the European 
settler society, the offspring of white-slave mis­
cegenation mostly remained as slaves, while
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those of white-Khosian descent tended to join 
the ranks of the literally names ‘Bastef (Bastard) 
communities. By and large, they came to form an 
impoverished rural proletariat, working along­
side the slaves on the white-owned farms. With­
out independent access to land or to capital 
within the colony, they were generally unable to 
escape the bondage in which they were held 
(Marais, 1939: p.163) One of the main reasons, 
therefore, why Coloured political organisations 
only began to emerge in the Cape after the 1880s, 
was the restrictive political and socio-economic 
environment of the colony, first under Dutch, 
and from 1806 onwards, under British rule. But 
an equally important factor was the heteroge­
neous nature of those people loosely described 
as Coloureds, which meant that they lacked any 
strong unifying sense of Coloured identity.
With the advent of British rule in the early nine­
teenth century came changes in the political and 
economic structure of the predominantly bur­
geoning philanthropic movement in Britain, 
based on a combination of religious and humani­
tarian idealism, and on a commitment to ‘free la­
bour capitalism’ and ‘bourgeois conceptions of 
society’. (Fredrickson, 1981: p. 163) New legisla­
tion in the colony in the form of Ordinance 50 of 
1828 established the principle of equality before 
law for all free people regardless of colour, re­
leasing the colonial ‘Hottentots’ from earlier re­
strictive labour legislation. Then, in the 1830s, 
came the abolition of slavery, followed by the 
gradual introduction of representative institu­
tions in the Cape, all based on a non-racial fran­
chise open to adult males who fulfilled certain 
property and wage qualifications, and culminat­
ing in the granting of representative government 
in 1853 and responsible government in 1872. 
(Marais, 1939: pp 156-157)
In reality, this Cape ‘liberation tradition’, al­
though entrenched in the colony’s institutions, 
changed little for most people of colour. The
freed slaves found themselves without land or 
capital, and master-servant legislation quickly 
reasserted control over the movement of free-la­
bour’ in the interests of employers. (Worden, 
1983: pp 8-9) Cape liberalism remained a con­
servative creed, accepting social and economic 
inequalities as the natural order of things. Al­
though it upheld the principles of individual civil 
rights, religious tolerance and constitutional 
government, all based on the fundamental tenet 
of the rule of law and equal rights for all ‘civilised’ 
men, liberalism in the Cape also linked political 
rights to property-ownership, and assumed the 
inherent superiority of Western standards of ‘ci­
vilisation’. And even though the principle of the 
non-racial franchise remained intact until 1910, 
the franchise qualifications were raised when­
ever Blacks threatened to constitute more than 
a minority of the electorate. (Trapido, 1964: pp 
52-54) Moreover, until 1894, voting was by pub­
lic ballot, making it difficult to defy the political 
wishes of superiors. In any case, most Blacks 
lacked the necessary property or wage qualifica­
tions to become eligible for the franchise. As for 
Coloured voters, although they did make their 
voices heard at times of political crisis, (Trapido 
1964: p.383) and took an active part in elections, 
there was little incentive, material or otherwise 
for them to mobilise around a Coloured identity. 
Those few rich, educated, and light-skinned 
enough could and often did meet their aspira­
tions by ‘passing’ into the White community, a 
process which siphoned off many of the natural 
leaders of Coloureds. (Marais, 1939: p.183) The 
rest remained for the most part as an impover­
ished rural proletariat, firmly under the political, 
social and economic control of their White em­
ployers.
Some free people of colour did seek to escape 
from the restrictions of the colony by moving 
outside it. In the early 1800s, a community of 
Whites, Africans, Khosian and mixed-race
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people engaged in hunting, trading and herding, 
established itself near some springs at Klaar- 
water, on the Cape’s turbulent northern frontier. 
The adopted, at the suggestion of their mission­
aries, the name Griqua, derived from that of an 
old Khoikoi clan. In the face of great adversities, 
and until the closing of the frontier in the late 
nineteenth century sealed their fate as an inde­
pendent community, they developed a strong 
sense of Griqua identity, which lives on among 
some of their descendents today. (Ross, 1976: pp 
1-6) Although the Griqua option was not a viable 
one for the broad mass of the Coloured people, 
the Griqua showed how a community of hete­
rogeneous origins, and one that remained open 
to White and African members, could use an in­
vented identity to create a sense of common soli­
darity, and mobilise that solidarity in defence of 
the group’s interests. For the Griqua, the adop­
tion of a Griqua identity was a voluntary choice 
on the part of the individual, not a genetic pre­
determination, and served as a means of advanc­
ing and protecting group material interests, and 
of conferring a sense of self-pride and belong­
ing. Within the colony, there were also other 
groups of people of colour involved in the pro­
cess of community formation. In particular, the 
people known as the Cape Malays, in fact Cape 
Muslims, popularly and inaccurately called Ma­
lays because of the Dutch East Indian origins of 
many of the early Muslims at the Cape, had by 
the nineteenth century carved a niche for them­
selves within colonial society. United by their 
shared religion -  Islam -  brought to the Cape 
during Dutch rule, they formed a growing com­
munity of mixed racial origins, mostly concen­
trated in Cape Town. As late as 1876, a Christian 
missionary in Cape Town noted that “... all Mus­
lims, even those o f English or Scottish blood, are 
indiscriminately called Malay’s”. For these con­
verts, Islam at the Cape offered not just religious 
consolation, but also an “. . .  impressive network 
of social, educational and religious institutions”.
They gained .. an identity as well as a religion.” 
(Shell, 1979)
The Malay identity, however, shared with the 
Griqua identity a self-segregating ethos apart 
from the mainstream of colonial society. For this 
reason, and because most Coloureds were 
Christians, a Malay identity could not serve as 
one around which the broad mass of the Col­
oured people could mobilise. (Patterson, 1953: 
p.196) It is significant, nonetheless, that Malays 
were the first amongst Coloureds to combine at 
the polls. Under leaders such as Abdol Burns, 
the Mahdi o f Cape Town’, Muslims in that city 
united from the 1860s around their social, econ­
omic and religious concerns. Consequently, 
White politicians began to cultivate the Malay 
vote at election time, one of them in the 1858 
elections for instance campaigning under a ban­
ner inscribed, in Arabic 1 Allah Be My Helper’! 
The creation of the Cape Muslim community, 
and the mobilisation of its voters by Burns and 
others, reveal the mixture of ideals and self-in­
terest involved in community formation amongst 
a section of the Coloured people of diverse eth­
nic origins, this time in an urban setting. But the 
growth of Malay political assertion was by the 
late nineteenth century only part of a wider 
general political awakening amongst Blacks in 
the Cape. (Saunders, Philips and Van Heyning- 
en, 1981: pp 174-175)
5. THE FAILUE OF COLOURED WORKING- 
CLASS ORGANISATIONS
5.1 Coloured working-class organisations 
1919-1931
The decade after the First World War saw an un­
precedented upsurge of labour organization and 
industrial action throughout the Union of South 
Africa. Amongst White workers, trade-union 
militancy reached a climax with the bloody revolt 
of White mineworkers on the Rand in 1922. The 
South African Party (SAP) government’s hand­
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ling of the uprising contributed to the victory in 
the 1924 general elections of the National-La­
bour Party alliance, the so-called Pact, which for 
the rest of the 1920s implemented a whole range 
of new measures to entrench White political and 
economic supremacy.
But along with the flexing of the industrial 
muscle of White workers went a parallel expan­
sion, from 1918 onwards, of Black trade-union 
organization and strike activity. The Industrial 
and Commercial Workers’ Union (ICU) of Cle­
ments Kadalie represented the most dramatic 
manifestations of this new trend. Founded in 
1919, the ICU grew to a membership estimated 
at over 100 000 by the late 1920s, the largest 
Black organisation in South Africa until very re­
cent times.
Coloured workers, no less than their African 
counterparts, were affected by the far-reaching 
changes of these years. Many joined the ICU; 
and the African People Organisation (APO) 
also sought for the first time to bring urban Col­
oured workers within its sway. Even Coloured 
farmworkers, hitherto neglected by all Black or­
ganisations, were swept up in an ANC campaign 
in the Western Cape from 1929-1931. Yet, by the 
end of the Great Depression in 1933, the ICU 
had lapsed into oblivion, the Western Cape 
ANC was shattered into fragments, and the 
APO had failed to organise Coloured workers.
Attempts to organise Coloured workers, both 
urban and rural, began, but in the first place it 
has to be understood why all such attempts 
ended in complete failure.
The APO for its part saw in the rising militancy 
of Coloured workers in Cape Town in the im­
mediate post-war years both an opportunity and 
a threat. The threat was that, for the first, time 
an alternative strategy of Black working-class 
unity was emerging, as against the APO policies 
of compromise and equal rights for all ‘civilised’
men, based on the mobilisation of Coloureds as 
a group. The opportunity lay in the potential Ab­
durahman saw in using the new militancy of un­
skilled urban Coloured workers, to organise 
them into trade unions under the aegis of the 
APO. This would not only help to improve the 
wages and working conditions of Coloured wor­
kers, but would also add to the strength of num­
bers and the threat of strike action to give force 
to the APO’s demands, while simultaneously 
heading off the radical challenge.
But the APO’s stress on a Coloured identity, and 
its moderate integrationist demands, proved less 
attractive to Coloured workers than the alterna­
tive of trade-union organisation with their fellow 
W hite or African workers to demand better pay 
and working conditions. By the late 1920s, how­
ever, the government had begun to intervene to 
crush the ICU’s activities amongst Black wor­
kers in the towns, as well as the Western Cape 
ANC’s attempts to organise Coloured farmwor­
kers. Nevertheless, the organisation of Black 
workers in the Cape, as in the rest of the Union, 
reached unprecedented heights in the 1920s 
and, for a while at least, provided a glimpse of 
the extent of discontent amongst underpaid and 
often grossly exploited rural and urban Black 
workers.
5.2 APO attempts to organise coloured workers
The APO’s mistrust of the motives of White la­
bour leaders and organisations was not based on 
pure self-interest, given the flood of White la­
bour legislation and policies, and White trade 
union demands for job reservation. The threat 
such policies posed to Coloured workers led the 
APO to contemplate the establishment of Col­
oured trade unions. The 1921 APO conference 
recommended that Coloured tradesmen or­
ganise under the auspices of the APO for their 
own protection from White trade union exclu- 
sionism. The conference also recommended that 
Coloured railway workers form their own trade
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union to fight the White labour policies on the 
Railways.
The APO launched the Federation of Labour in 
1919. It was an ideal climate for industrial or­
ganisation since there were large numbers of 
urban unskilled workers in industrial concerns 
dissatisfied with their wages and working condi­
tions at a time when their labour was in great de­
mand. In sum, the APO’s decision to organise 
Coloured trade unions can be attributed to the 
propitiousness of the times for such an organisa­
tion; a desire to counter the blandishments of 
rival organisations and gather support beyond 
the Coloured elite for the APO; and a genuine 
concern for the welfare and interests of Col­
oured workers themselves.
The APO hoped that its Federation would incor­
porate the well-established Coloured craft 
unions such as the Cabinet Workers Union and 
the Typographical Works Union, but both of 
these preferred to remain within the Cape 
Federation of Labour. The APO’s venture into 
labour failed and foundered while the efforts of 
the Cape Federation were steadily more suc­
cessful.
Part of the failure of the APO must be ascribed 
to its inability to show Coloured artisans that af­
filiation would be in their interests. Coloured 
supporters of the Cape Federation instead ac­
cused the APO of attempting to divide the whole 
working-class into separate camps. Such actions, 
they argued, played into the hands of the Trans­
vaal-based SAIF with its exclusionist white trade 
union members. (Van der Ross, 1976: pp 159- 
162) When it was argued that the White workers 
persistently scabbed on Coloured workers and 
‘smashed their strikes for higher wages’, the Cape 
Federation and defenders replied that it pro­
vided better protection for Coloured workers 
than the APO federation could.
Here lay the crux of the issue. The APO had
neither the funds, nor the experience or a proven 
record, which the Cape Federation had. In ad­
dition, given the growing demands of Transvaal 
unionists for the protection of White labour, 
Coloured artisans in the multiracial Cape Feder­
ation could not but be aware of the danger to 
their interests if they broke with their fellow 
White workers. For skilled Coloured workers, 
whatever their private sympathies, the APO of­
fered no advantages.
Neither did the APO Federation win substantial 
support from unskilled Coloured workers. The 
ICU, by contrast, founded in the same year as 
the APO, steadily gathered unskilled Black wor­
kers.
The failure of the APO can be ascribed to its in­
ability to attract working-class Coloured support 
for its elitist programme and demands. Not only 
did the APO’s lack of progress toward its own 
goals make it an unattractive alternative to other 
forms of organisation for Coloured workers, but 
its failure to organise strike action or demon­
strate its ability to obtain better working condi­
tions and wages for its supporters must have 
rendered it useless from the workers point of 
view. Besides, alternative labour organisations 
already existed, many of them founded at the 
same time as the APO -  some of them with a 
proven record of advancing their members’ in­
terests.
5.3 Attempts to organise rural Western Cape 
workers
Rural workers lived in small scattered com­
munities, impoverished and often illiterate. They 
were more difficult to organise and were often 
vulnerable to the hostility of their employers.
The APO had long expressed concern over the 
low wages and poor working conditions of these 
workers. After the war, the APO encouraged its 
workers to organise Coloured farm labour 
unions and strikes during harvest time.
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The first significant attempt to organise rural 
workers in the Western Cape was taken on by 
the Western Cape ANC. This had considerable 
significance for it was the first major effort to 
mobilise Coloured farm labourers who formed 
the majority of the Coloured working population 
in the Cape. (Simons and Simons, 1969: p.227) 
Furthermore, the campaign mobilized Coloured 
and African workers in a united struggle on the 
basis of their common concerns about wages and 
working conditions.
In addition, some factions in the Western Cape 
pushed not just for job-related reforms, but for 
a radical rural resistance movement aiming ulti­
mately at a fundamental reshaping of South Af­
rica’s political and economic structures. Lastly, 
the Campaign revealed the almost insurmount­
able obstacles to organising rural Black workers 
on a sizable scale. The ANC activists met with 
fierce resistance form the local White farmers 
and this, combined with government action, cul­
minated in the crushing of the ANC’s efforts by 
1931. But the campaign remains one of the very- 
few attempts to organise Black workers on a 
rural scale in South Africa.
Despite this crushing defeat, the achievements 
of the ANC were impressive. It had demon­
strated the essential unity of material interests 
that existed between Coloured and African wor­
kers, setting important precedents for mass 
Black unity. It also, for a while, offered an outlet 
for years of deep-seated frustration and despair 
amongst rural Black workers.
It failed not because of poor organization, poor 
leadership or lukewarm rank and file support, 
but because of the violence of White vigilantes, 
resulting police action and the authorities. After 
the collapse of the efforts of the ANC, the Black 
political leaders of the Cape concentrated their 
efforts on the more easily organised local urban 
workforce.
6. PRE -1979 COLOURED LABOUR RELA­
TIONS IN THE WESTERN CAPE.
6.1 Introduction
South African legislation relating to trade union­
ism and collective bargaining prior to 1979, the 
report of the Wiehahn Commission, was well 
known for its racially discriminatory provisions 
and for its inferior treatment accorded to Black 
workers and their organizations. The provisions 
of this legislation were widely recognized to im­
pede the development of a vigorous and effec­
tive Black labour movement which could 
struggle for an end to the exploitation of Black 
workers. To understand some of the function 
and purpose of the legislation, it would be 
necessary to understand some of the circumstan­
ces in which it originated and the ‘problems' it 
was designed to solve.
In summary, it may be said that the pre-1979 in­
dustrial legislation w-as an instrument of the 
classes of property owners dominant in the so­
ciety. The variant of the Industrial Conciliation 
Act was employed by the State when political 
considerations made the direct repression of 
some organized section of the wage earning 
population impossible or impractical, and it in­
volved the regulation and institutionalization of 
power won by wage earners in the struggle. It 
thus represented a practical compromise, but 
one in which employers were dominant and 
which enabled their interests to remain domi­
nant.
To succeed in this it was necessary to make a 
number of changes in the character of the labour 
movement concerned. In general, this involved 
the creation and sustenance of a bureaucratic 
hierarchy of officials, distinct from the rank and 
file members, whose life style, work and outlook 
had more in common with the employers and 
state officials than workers.
As a compromise solution, some concessions
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were of necessity made part of any such package. 
For the White wage earners this involved the 
gain of substantial increases in income and job 
terms. The main reasons advanced for this ar­
rangement were that White wage earners were 
and are a comparatively small proportion of the 
workforce, that their early militancy was likely to 
influence the Black working class and that these 
concessions were made at the expense of Black 
incomes. Also, the development of large scale 
manufacturing industry created the need for a 
stratum of supervisors and controllers. In the last 
analysis, the legislation remained a means of 
continuing the domination over Black labour.
62 Working-class organization in the Western 
Cape
Within contemporary literature, there appears 
to be a lack of analysis of registered trade unions. 
Lewis was of the opinion that this was of particu­
lar political significance in the case of the West­
ern Cape. (Lewis, 1983)
There was a certain conventional wisdom (ideo­
logy) surrounding registered trade unions which 
characterised these unions in terms of an all too 
simple identification with ‘White’ workers. The 
exceptional characteristics of the Western Cape, 
where a number of Coloured workers were 
members of registered unions were noted, but 
only as a deviation from the empirically defined 
norm. What followed then was usually an expla­
nation of the exceptional features of the West­
ern Cape trade union structure in terms of the 
‘liberaV tradition of the Cape. The operation of 
ideology is not denied; in point of fact certain of 
the issues raised herein bring the importance of 
ideological factors to the fore. An example, by 
way of illustration, is the 1956 legislation segre­
gating the registered mixed unions and prohibit­
ing henceforth the formation of unions on a 
‘mixed’ basis. Also, to understand the question 
of worker organisation in the Western Cape, the 
skill composition of the workforce and the
changing labour process at this period must be 
emphasized. A further issue worth emphasis is 
the pertinent political area reviewed earlier.
63 The pattern until 1956
Although there were exceptions, the general 
pattern in the early days in the Cape was that 
Coloured and White members were enrolled in 
the same union. In the early 1930s, a number of 
new unions were established with mainly Col­
oured or Indian members. A few of these did ac­
cept Africans. Of the White unions, only a few, 
like the Mine Workers Union, had a constitu­
tional colour bar. Most of the rest were or­
ganised for occupations from which non-Whites 
were excluded by law, by employers or by trade 
union monopoly. (Simons, 1948: p.165) There 
were a few unions in Cape Town which had 
White members only. The S.A. Operative Ma­
sons’ Society, a national body which excluded 
non-Whites at the Cape as well as elsewhere, and 
the Cape Hairdressers Employees Association, 
which in 1942 stated that there were no non- 
Whites in the trade who were eligible for mem­
bership. Later, however, it accepted Coloured 
members in Cape Town only. (Simons, 1948: 
p.165)
A Trade Union Congress was set up in 1926, with 
affiliated unions throughout the Union of South 
Africa exclusive of the Western Cape, where the 
Cape Federation of Labour Unions functioned. 
In 1929, the Trade Union Congress recom­
mended the enrolment of all employees in their 
respective unions, irrespective of race or colour. 
If this was not agreed upon, then an alternative 
policy of parallel branches in the unions would 
have had to be agreed upon. Both these sugges­
tions were, however, not acceptable to many of 
the unions in the North.
6.4 Separation of Coloured and White workers
The Industrial Legislation Commission was di­
rected, inter alia, to make recommendations on
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the future of mixed unions. It stated in its report 
that the evidence presented to it was overwhelm­
ingly against the introduction of legislation com­
pelling the segregation of the various races into 
separate unions. The arguments of the em­
ployers and employees who gave evidence was, 
in brief, that there should be no interference with 
the principle of the right of association; that wor­
kers in each industry should have the right to de­
cide whether they wanted mixed or separate 
unions.
It was also argued that the rights of the workers 
were indivisible. Separation would weaken the 
position of the workers vis-a-vis the employers. 
If separate unions were created in an industry, 
one union might attempt to undermine the posi­
tion of the other. The employers, too, were in fa­
vour of a single channel of negotiation. 
Fragmentation, they felt, might lead to the de­
struction of the Industrial Council system.
Counter arguments by the Commission were 
that it was idle to deny that there were differen­
ces in education and standards of living or that 
racial prejudice existed. Mixed unions did not 
provide adequate protection for the economic 
interests of minority workers. The group in the 
majority negotiated the wages paid to all. In 
times of depression, where non-Whites were in 
the majority in any particular industry, they 
might, because of their lower living standards, be 
willing to accepts lower wages for all workers in 
that industry to avoid unemployment. White 
workers were often unwilling to join mixed 
unions unless a closed shop provision applied.
Recommendations of the Commission were that 
the policy should be to achieve the organisation 
of White and non-White workers in separate 
racial trade unions. Existing mixed unions 
should be compelled to separate unions. The 
Commissioners admitted that parallel unions for 
the different races would create difficulties and
complications in the system of wage regulation, 
but suggested various expedients whereby these 
difficulties might be minimized.
6.5 Attitudes toward the racial division of 
unions
The TUC encouraged its members to form sep­
arate branches rather than to split into separate 
unions. It pointed out that division weakened the 
position of the workers vis-a-vis the employer 
and expressed a fear that Coloured workers 
might, in terms of economic depression, accept 
a wage reduction at the expense of the White 
workers within that industry. Furthermore, the 
TUC was anxious that the assets of the unions 
should be preserved intact.
The SA Congress of Trade Unions on the other 
hand, pointed out, that Coloured members of 
mixed unions had been deprived of any effective 
voice in the administration of their unions. It felt 
that it would be in the best interests of these 
members to break away and form separate 
unions which would be directly represented at 
Industrial Council, Conciliation Board or Wage 
Board meetings, and would be free to determine 
their own policies. SACTU itself had no mixed 
unions affiliated to it.
6.6 Attitudes of coloured trade unionists
The large majority of Coloured trade unionists 
had belonged to the racially mixed rather than 
to the segregated unions. Membership of these 
older, more established unions offered various 
economic advantages; these unions possessed 
well endowed benefit funds and were able to give 
security and backup during periods of hardship 
if members were victimized. Also, in many of the 
industries concerned, the principle of the rate 
for the job applied, and Coloureds who re­
mained in separate branches of mixed unions 
thus benefitted from representations made by 
the central executive committees.
In some trades, especially those where job reser­
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vation had been introduced at the request of the 
White workers, Coloured workers felt that their 
progress had been blocked and were embittered 
and resentful. (Horrel, 1969) Still others were 
resentful of the all-White executive committee 
arrangement. Others argued that separate de­
velopment was inescapably the policy of the 
country and that Coloureds should, therefore, 
assume full responsibility for their own affairs 
and should develop their own leadership rather 
than assume second hand responsibility through 
White leaders. Toward the end of 1968, a strong 
groundswell of opinion as to the desirability of 
breaking away from TUCSA arose. This debate 
was exacerbated to some extent by the question 
of whether or not Black unions should be re­
tained within TUSCA. Many of these Coloured 
unions felt that they would be better served by a 
co-ordinating council of their own.
There were other Coloured unions which re­
mained independent and decided to remain 
neutral when this split came. Representatives of 
these unions claimed that while they recognized 
the need for workers to stand together, they 
preferred to avoid association with any organi­
sation they regarded as being sectional or con­
troversial.
6.7 Conclusions
The provisions of the 1956 Industrial Concilia­
tion Act had a particular importance for the 
Western Cape where a large proportion of the 
Coloured labour force is employed and where 
the decision to separate the registered mixed 
unions met with widespread opposition. How­
ever, whilst separation of the unions appeared to 
have much affect on the economic bargaining 
position of both White and Coloured trade 
union members, it had no descernible effect on 
the mass of unorganised Coloured workers. 
Whilst the 1956 Act may have created a rift with­
in the ranks of the already organised, skilled 
workers, it did not affect the relationship be­
tween Coloured skilled, semi-skilled and un­
skilled workers. Thus broad ideological factors, 
the racist definitions of the Act in this case, cer­
tainly did divide the ranks of the working class, 
but they were not the only or necessarily the most 
important divisions. The technical division of la­
bour itself is responsible for economic, political 
and ideological divisions within the working- 
class, and when an understanding is attempted 
of the marked lack of organisation of the un­
skilled Coloured workers, one would have to 
look beyond the legislative impact of the 1956 
Act.
Embodied in mixed trade unions was the separ­
ation between the economic and political 
struggles. White skilled workers allied them­
selves economically with Coloured skilled and 
semi-skilled workers while politically they sup­
ported the maintenance of White dominance. 
Mixed trade unionism was never used as struggle 
for the political rights of Coloured workers -  in­
stead it was used to contain the struggle. Incor­
poration in the economic struggle would contain 
the political struggle by institutionalizing indus­
trial conflict, that is, by incorporating trade 
unions into institutions of collective bargaining, 
the growth of a militant non-White trade union 
movement could be pre-empted. The method of 
protection embodied within Coloured mixed 
unions was the basis for the assumption that the 
institutionalization of conflict was superior to re­
pression as a means of containing the political 
struggle.
The divisions introduced into the ranks of the 
trade union by the 1956 Act constituted a “. . . 
gross interference with freedom of association” 
(Lewis, 1983) However, it did not have the an­
ticipated effect of prompting the registered 
unions to salvage their lost solidarity by looking 
to the unskilled and semi-skilled workers. This 
begs the question as to why the unions chose to 
fix their attention on the skilled workers to the
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almost total exclusion of unskilled workers.
A possible explanation is that the mixed and Col­
oured unions in the Western Cape have in the 
past been dominated by skilled craftsman since 
at least the turn of the century. Coloured wor­
kers were thus admitted to the unions because 
they were firmly established in most of the im­
portant trades. The relative liberalism of the 
Cape unionists and White wage earners is, there­
fore, to be explained by the rather expedient 
grasping of crucial opportunities. Craft unions 
would only open their ranks to the unskilled wor­
kers when the job of artisan had been irreversibly 
diluted or fragmented. But in terms of the pre­
valent economistic craft-type perspective, there 
was no a priori reason for opening their ranks to 
unskilled workers. It was simpler to organise 
relatively stable, employed skilled workers than 
to organise lowly paid, often unemployed, un­
skilled workers. Also, and undoubtedly, the sim­
plest way of resolving any economically 
grounded conflict which might have arisen be­
tween skilled and unskilled workers would have 
been to keep the conflict out of the union.
Furthermore, the domination of skilled unions 
reinforced itself. If the craft unions were domi­
nant, it was obvious that the co-ordinating 
bodies would be dominated by the immediate 
economic interests of the skilled workers.
The policies and priorities of the registered 
unions at the time have also to be read against 
the political struggles of the time-conflicts be­
tween the various political organisations sym­
pathetic to the interests of the broad working- 
class and struggles between the state and the 
various political organisations actively co-oper­
ating with the unions.
The State’s views were crystallized in the actions 
taken against trade unionists immediately after 
the passage of the Suppression of Communism 
Act. A generalized assumption of these actions
is that they reflected the antagonism toward any 
attempt to assist in the organisation of Black 
workers. Such action equally retarded the devel­
opment of unions of which unskilled Coloured 
workers were members. The Communist Party 
played an active role in the organisation of un­
skilled Coloured workers in the Western Cape. 
Together with other organisations such as the 
Coloured Unemployment League and the Afri­
can Federation of Trade Unions, they were in­
volved in the formation of unions such as the S.A. 
Railway and Harbour Workers Union and the 
Food and Canning Workers Union.
These organisations were subjected to severe 
harassment and many of their leaders were im­
prisoned or banned. The unions wherein they 
had played a leading role were isolated from the 
mainstream of trade union activity in the West­
ern Cape and were severely criticized by the es­
tablished unions.
Thus the actions of the State, perhaps not expli­
citly directed at the organisation of Coloured 
workers, certainly had the effect of retarding the 
development of unskilled Coloured workers in 
the Western Cape.
These two factors of themselves did not account 
for the lack of organisation among unskilled Col­
oured workers in the Western Cape, but they 
were of critical importance.
The 1956 legislation only directly affected the 
position of the skilled workers. It reduced their 
bargaining power and, in a more general sense, 
bolstered the racist ideology separating the Col­
oureds and the Whites. Without doubt, the criti­
cal division in the Western Cape was within the 
ranks of the semi- and unskilled workers, that is 
the division between Coloured and Black wor­
kers. Organisation of unskilled workers in the 
Western Cape would ultimately have to include 
both Coloured and African workers. As Alexan­
der and Simons pointed out: “Coloureds, Indians
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and Africans have a common interest... But their 
statuses are unequal. As long as the registration of 
a union confers a real or imagined advantage on 
its members, it is unlikely that Coloured and In­
dian workers will adopt the course open to any 
union of not seeking registration.” (Alexander 
and Simons, 1959: p.38)
7. A SCENARIO FOR A POST-APARTHEID 
SOUTH AFRICA
7.1 The concept of ideology
For many, the word ideology evokes the images 
of Communism, Marxism and Socialism. For 
others, ideology is a form of false consciousness 
embodied in Capitalism, Afrikaner nationalism 
and racialism. Those who accuse others of being 
ideological often presume that they themselves 
are free from ideology, while those who use it in 
a more neutral sense believe it refers to a moral 
world view. When the word was first coined at 
the time of thee French Revolution, ideology or 
the science of ideas was intended to provide a 
true foundation for all other sciences.
Four different levels at which the term can be 
understood are suggested in order to synthesize 
the different meanings of ideology as used in dif­
ferent contexts.
12 Ideology as world view
Ideology is understood at this most general level 
as an organic system of ideas that interprets re­
ality from one specific perspective. Nationalism, 
for example, interprets the world from the vant­
age point of the nation. The identity of the na­
tion creates symbols which generate solidarity 
and enable people to understand their being in 
the world. Such an understanding of ideology is 
neutral and universal.
73 Ideology at the level of politics and econo­
mics
On this level ideologies refer to those world 
views that have a specific political and economic
outlook. Ideology here is understood as an ac­
tion-related system of ideas and institutions in­
tended  to change or defend an existing 
socio-economic order. A distinction betwee pol­
itical ideologies (nationalism, Marxism, lib­
eralism) and economic ideologies (feudalism, 
capitalism, socialism). These ideologies present 
a specific analysis of the present social order, re­
late it to a future ideal, and outline a strategy to 
achieve the desired state, whether by maintain­
ing the present order, or by reforming it, or by 
replacing it with a new order.
This second level is still universal; everybody is 
involved, consciously or unconsciously. A per­
son is born into a specific political or economic 
ideology before he can consciously confirm or 
correct it. One’s ideology reflects, as a general 
rule, one’s class origin and position in society.
One’s class, position and origin in society ex­
press the vested interest one has in maintaining 
or changing the present status quo. This does not 
mean, however, that one’s class position and in­
terests necessarily determine one’s ideological 
commitment. Moral, religious and psychological 
reasons and motivations can induce people to 
opt for a different society.
Ideologies are not simply systems of ideas. They 
are embodied in social institutions like political 
parties, churches, the army and in the media.
7.4 Ideology as false consciousness
This level represents the specifically Marxian 
understanding of ideology. Ideologies as false 
consciousness distort the truth, consciously or 
unconsciously; they are a deformed and inverted 
reflection of what is real. They conceal behind a 
mask of objectivity and moral acceptability the 
actual economic, political and social interests of 
a specific group.
Ideologies in the sense of false consciousness are 
found within dominant groups. They arise out of
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the desire of a group to justify before itself and 
before others its privileges, political power, so­
cial prestige, and financial benefits. Ideology as 
a mechanism of self-justification can create the 
collective illusion of legitimacy and accept­
ability; ideally, this illusion is also shared by a 
considerable part of the dominated groups; 
thereby ensuring the cohesion and credibility of 
the dominant parties.
7.5 Total ideology: level of religion
Certain ideologies can assume a totalitarian 
character upon becoming total ideologies. They 
become like a religion, setting absolute value on 
a finite reality such as nation, culture, security or 
revolution. Hitler’s nationalist socialism, fascism 
are total ideologies. Whereas the Marxism of 
Marx constitutes above all an analysis of capital­
ism and a strategy to overcome it, Soviet ideo­
logy has made it a total ideology. It has become 
a secular religion, the total answer to man’s dee­
pest questions. Total ideology is false to the de­
gree which it makes part of reality the total 
reality. It encloses the world, the total reality, in 
a narrow confinement. To present the partial 
truth as the whole truth, it uses massive repress­
ion and coercion at all levels, physical, psycho­
logical, mental. It compels consent by reign of 
terror to make up for what it lacks in real sup­
port by the people.
When ideology becomes a total ideology, it de­
generates from a symbol into an idol. A symbol 
discloses the world, an idol veils it. A symbol 
points beyond itself toward a greater reality 
whereas an idol, knowing only its own little truth, 
stifles within in its confines. A symbol liberates 
and an idol oppresses. A symbol invites partici­
pation and stimulates creativity; an idol needs 
absolute domination and remains poor, for it ex­
cludes the totality of the richness of the truth.
7.6 Apartheid as an ideology
The characteristic international image of the
South African system is more commonly 
summed up by the word ‘Iapartheid’ than by any 
other single term. Where does apartheid fit into 
a discussion of ideology? Moodie described 
apartheid as a ‘civil religion’, defined in these 
terms:
“Civil religions denotes the religious dimension of 
the State. As such it is invariably associated with 
the exercise o f power and with the constant re­
generation of a social order; it gives a transcend­
ent referent for sovereignty within a given territory. 
The ultimate nature and destiny o f political power 
is thus connoted in the symbols of the civil faith 
and reenacted by civic ritual" (Moodie, 1975: 
p.276) However, treating apartheid as a civil reli­
gion illuminates only one of its aspects -  the as­
pect referred to by Giddens as the ‘naturalising 
process'. (Giddens, 1979: p.195) This is taken to 
mean the process whereby the state function­
aries use apartheid to suggest to the population, 
especially the White population, that the status 
quo is a reflection of a historically legitimated 
‘state o f nature’ and a wholly normal current state 
of affairs. As well as being limited to this dimen­
sion, seeing apartheid as a civil religion serves to 
highlight its function and meaning for the ruling 
group, but says nothing about the way apartheid 
is experienced by the majority black population.
Black South Africans are now too politically mo­
bilised and the international community is now 
too sensitized for the government to continue 
with the use of the term apartheid. A consider­
able variety of newspeak, derived from current 
political movements and debates in political 
science and sociology in other parts of the world, 
have been put to use to lend authenticity to the 
official line that, although South Africa’s prob­
lems are unusual in their magnitude, they are 
being dealt with through policies that other na­
tions have adopted -  though in the face of a few 
problems that few nations have experienced. 
‘Political Independence’; ‘Internal Autonomy’-,
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and ‘Self Determination’ is what is supposed to 
be happening to the old ‘bantustans’ and ‘home­
lands'. ‘Bantu tribes’ and ‘Non-Europeans’ have 
been transmuted into ‘Black Nations’. Section 10 
workers are referred to as ‘Urban Black Com­
munities’. As to the relations between Black, 
White, Coloured and Asian communities, these 
can be seen as a form of Ethnic Pluralism and 
can be politically ordered through a form of 
Confederation (where communities are geo­
graphically separated), or through Co-operative 
Coexistence, or Consociational Democracy, 
where they are less separated.
The proliferation of new vocabulary can be re­
garded as an implicit recognition by the ruling 
party and its organic intellectuals that the force 
of real events and real struggles must in turn pro­
voke a genuine rethink of strategies and options 
available to the White electorate. The question 
arises whether this shifting language is a signal 
that the long road from White supremacy, to 
White hegemony, to White partnership, to 
White minority protection and finally non­
racialism is seriously being embarked upon. Or 
whether this shift in language is yet another cos­
metic device designed to distract the opponents 
of apartheid, deflect its international critics and 
carry on business as before.
An answer to these questions must hinge on an 
assessment of which elements in the social struc­
ture and in social practice are fundamental to 
the basic functioning of the society and which are 
dispensable. Apartheid as a social practice and 
legal requirement covers so many areas of ordi­
nary life that it is quite difficult to decide what is 
or is not fundamental.
One ends with an implicit trichotomy. Petty 
apartheid which still provides much salt for the 
wounds suffered by the Black community, but 
which has been formally and legally outlawed, 
without major systemic consequences. Limited
concessions, which have been presented to the 
White electorate as petty apartheid lest they trig­
ger a revanchist lurch to the far right, but do have 
some important systemic implications. And fun­
damental structures, which if undermined, will 
profoundly alter the current forms of social and 
political organisation, leading to what is loosely 
(but wrongly if it means a single event) described 
as the ‘revolution’.
7.7 Apartheid is dying, but will it lie down?
Rather than attempt to survey popular or inter­
national views, three academic and hopefully ob­
jective views have been selected in an attempt to 
answer the above question. All three positions 
are what can be termed conservative, in so far as 
they all cohere around a common stance -  name­
ly that the capacity for revolutionary change in 
South Africa is exaggerated, that the capacities 
of the government to adapt are underestimated, 
and that it may be possible to contain unrest and 
dissent at a manageable level. The three authors 
attempt to grapple with what may be judged to 
be the dominant dialectic of the endgame in 
South Africa, that between change and conti­
nuity, between evolutionary and revolutionary- 
prospects.
7.8 A pragmatic race oligarchy?
The first view discussed is that of Adam in ‘Mod­
ernising Racial Domination’. (Adam, 1971) 
Though the earliest of the three views, it is the 
most sophisticated, in that the author is fully cog­
nizant of the repressive and unstable elements of 
the government, yet nonetheless seeks to dem­
onstrate how it has the capacity to develop a set 
of policies in response to pressure. The govern­
ment is broadly characterised as a ‘pragmatic 
race oligarchy’ though the ideology of apartheid 
itself is thought to have certain utopian elements.
According to Adam (1971: p.69) “Verwoerd re­
alised that he had to create a political outlet for 
African nationalism. Die bantustan policy is sup­
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posed to fulfill this function. It deflectspolitical 
Mlaspirations to areas where they are no danger 
to White rule.” He suggests, quite plausibly, that 
the policy of bantustans is not that different from 
the policy of indirect rule successfully practiced 
by colonial administrators all over Africa. Adam 
surmises further, that in the short term, ‘black sa­
traps’ will be satisfied with the minor privileges 
conferred by the state, given that their historical 
experience has comprised nothing but degrada­
tion and subjection. (1971: p.80) Adam however, 
was convinced, and subsequent events have 
proved him accurate, that the homelands policy 
have provided only a minor solution to the prob­
lem posed by the growth of an urban African 
population. He also maintains that it is im­
possible to segment the South African economy, 
given the close interpenetration of White capital 
with Black labour.
He deals intermittently with the important ques­
tion of rising expectations and the gap between 
‘claim’ and ‘reality’, arguing with good com­
parative support, that poverty alone is no guar­
antee of a heightened political consciousness. 
He opines that “. . .  in South Africa an expanding 
economy has made it possible so far to meet the 
rising material expectations and not to heighten 
the discrepancy between ideology and reality”. 
(1971: pp 101-102) In Adam’s view, the main 
lever for pragmatic adaptation lies in the in­
creasing heterogeneity of the Afrikaner popula­
tion. With the poor White problem a thing of the 
past, large numbers of Afrikaners are entering 
managerial, professional and business positions. 
These form the core of the ‘verligte’ element, who 
will be able to propel their more traditional co­
ethnics (verkramptes) to compromise and adapt 
to new conditions. In the recent elections for the 
White House of Assembly, the resurgence of the 
HNP and CP and the ideological dilemma of the 
ruling NP lends credence to this view. Adam sees 
apartheid as an ‘elastic’ race nationalism capable
of internal liberalisation, in contrast to the irra­
tionality of national socialism in Germany and 
continues:
“Above all, rational racial domination is most 
likely to falsify the assumption that mounting in­
ternal tension will make a violent revolutionary 
change inevitable. The South African Whites, who 
at present determine the racial policies over their 
country, have almost perfected their domination 
over the non-White labour potential, and they will 
continue to do this in their own interests. They are 
not, as often viewed by the outside world, blindly 
fumbling toward their inevitable end. They are ef­
fective technocrats, who are establishing an in­
creasingly unshakable oligarchy in a society where 
the wealth of an advanced industrialization in the 
hands o f the few Mutes coexists with the relative 
deprivation of the non-whites. I f  this is to be 
cemented by a gradual deracialization and econ­
omic concessions, South Africa’s white elite is ca­
pable o f achieving this in spite o f internal 
contradictions,.” (1971: pp 181-182)
7.9 A multi - ethnic elite?
The second view cited is that provided by Gann 
and Duignan in ‘Why South Africa Will Survive’. 
(Duignan & Gann, 1979) The two authors en­
gage in a polemic against what they see as a libe­
ral and Marxist orthodoxy regarding the South 
African government’s wickedness and the 
country’s potential instability. The broad direc­
tion of their arguments is to suggest that the 
trickle-down effects of successful modernization 
will dilute Black claims, that the government in 
large measure is invincible and, and that despite, 
or because of, the possibility of violence killing 
the golden goose for all, the various ethnically- 
distinct elites will be able to cobble together a 
new and workable constitutional order. They de­
velop these arguments in the following pro­
nouncements:
“Unlike a truly decadent mling class, South Afri­
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can whites are willing to tax themselves heavily 
and to conscript their sons...
The whites perform essential economic functions; 
for the time being the greater part o f South Afri­
ca’s administrative, entrepreneurial and technical 
skills... South Africa -  alone in sub-Saharan A f­
rica-has built up a reasonably balanced economy 
complete with modem manufactures, extensive 
mining industries and an advanced agricultural 
sector.
In military terms, South Africa is well equipped. It 
is a match for any conventional opponent except 
a superpower. South Africais equally prepared to 
deal with guerrilla incursions.
. . . the benefits o f economic development have 
begun to trickle down to all racial groups, albeit in 
uneven measure. Black South Africans -  despite 
their disabilities -  are among the best paid, best 
educated, most urbanized Blacks in Africa... UN 
propaganda notwithstanding there are now sub­
stantial numbers of Black South Africans who 
have a great deal more to lose than their chains.
South Africa. . . is not sufficiently dependent on 
imported capital to be vulnerable to ultimata from 
the outside world. Because conflict will not resolve 
the country’s problems and consensus may be im­
possible to achieve, a third way should be tried -  
a consociational system... Consociation implies 
continued social and ethnic diversity based on a 
policy of pragpiatism and tempered by co-oper­
ation between the elites in each social group.
Reform in South Africa will come from within. It 
will derive from the ruling Nationalist Party rather 
than from a divided opposition. . . The National 
Party today is a coalition... with... a substantial 
reformist group made up o f businessmen and pro­
fessional people, technicians and specialists in 
both the public and private sectors, clergyman and 
senior members o f the defense establishment 
anxious to strengthen the country’s industrial
power and determined to create a wiser social con­
sensus”. (1979: pp 288-304)
7.10 An impasse?
The final view of the limited possibilities for fun­
damental change in South Africa comes from 
Schlemmer’s ‘Build-up to Revolution or Im ­
passe?’ (Schlemmer, 1983) The main thrust of 
this analysis is that South Africa is far from being 
particularly unstable by world standards. He ar­
gues that the source of most instability derives 
from outside threats rather than internal dissent. 
He claims that a series of survey results demon­
strate that Blacks are adopting a cautious politi­
cal response, despite high levels of dissatis­
faction, because the instruments of coercion and 
control are too strong for them to oppose.
He adopts a modified view of Gurr’s criteria ex­
plaining ‘why men rebel’. (Gurr, 1970). While 
survey evidence conducted in 1982 showed ‘very 
high’ and rapidly increasing levels of expressed 
anger, impatience and dissatisfaction and other 
indicators showed a “.. .potentialfor political ag­
gression or violence.. .”, (Schlemmer, 1983: p.67) 
he argues that the minimum political demands 
by a wide cross-section of Blacks are surprising­
ly moderate. Schlemmer also reports that 70% 
of the Blacks surveyed in 1982 valued White par­
ticipation in South African society and White 
technical expertise, and that many saw the possi­
bility of patience, negotiation and the building 
up of bargaining power leading to peaceful re­
forms and concessions. (Schlemmer, 1973: p.72)
He concludes by arguing that Gurr’s structural 
and organisational criteria for ‘turmoil, civil war 
or effective conspiracy’ are not met by black pol­
itical leaders inside South Africa. Though he ac­
cepts that political discontent among the Blacks 
is constrained by coercion and fear, Schlemmer 
goes further in assuming a more positive com­
pliance by Blacks derived from: (a) the in­
cremental improvements in material welfare; (b)
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the opportunities for social mobility by educated 
Blacks in the administration system of the apart­
heid homelands; and (c) the high levels of exter­
nally-based insurgency. Schlemmer maintains 
that .. real or apparent system responsiveness, 
coupled with effective security’ controls and an 
emasculation o f counter-system organization, is 
least likely to continue to protect the established 
regime functions, at least in the short term.” 
(Schlemmer, 1983: pp 76-77)
7.11 A critique of conservatism
A common thread running through the analyses 
of the authors cited above is that they all find the 
final locus of power in the groups that wield it 
and insist on locating any movement in the sys­
tem within the broad ruling group. Thus Adam 
fixes on the Verligte Afrikaner to make his system 
more flexible and responsive; Gann and Duig­
nan talk of a ‘substantial reformist group’ within 
the party; while Schlemmer contents himself 
with saying that “. . .  the degree of regime sun’eill- 
ance, control, action against radical organizations 
as well as its motivation (its White leadership and 
substantial White personnel ensures loyalty) is suf­
ficient to promote reform -  vague and sweeping 
promises o f refonn and development are simply 
made from time to time as a sop to world opi­
nion”. (Schlemmer, 1983; p.79)
By focussing only on the capacity of the govern­
ment to effect changes, we are given absolutely 
no sense of the degree of organisational capac­
ity, political consciousness or level of mobiliza­
tion of the subject population. This top-down 
approach could lead conservative theorists to 
believe the regime’s own statements about itself. 
This is not true of Adam, who does maintain a 
sceptical distance, but it is all too apparent in 
Gann and Duignan. Their statements that South 
Africa can “. .  .deal with a guerrilla incursio.. .” 
and is . not sufficiently dependant on foreign 
capital to be vulnerable to ultimata. . .” have 
turned out to be baseless in the face of the real­
ities of the September 1985 foreign debt mora­
torium called by the South African government 
and the subsequent collapse of the Rand in the 
face of a quceze of foreign capital during 1985. 
Also, the heightened intensity of sabotage at­
tacks does not lend credence to their former 
statements. Schlemmer displays a similar cre­
dulity about regime claims in quoting, and ap­
parently accepting, police statements that “. . 
over ninety percent of underground insurgents who 
have participated in some act of sabotage are 
tracked down”. (Schlemmer, 1983: p.9)
In order to make sense of the shifting ideology 
and practice of apartheid at this juncture, it 
would be necessary to assess the reaction of the 
government to pressures from the bottom of the 
social structure rather than from within its own 
ranks. To assist in this exercise, it might be help­
ful to make certain assumptions about the shape 
of a future South Africa in order to identify best 
those elements of a social structure that will re­
main unamenable or or not easily amenable to 
an almost immediate change should the current 
ruling class lose political power.
7.11.1 Assumption one: continual unrest 
The incidence of urban unrest, the level of black 
political consciousness and the loss of foreign in­
vestors’ confidence in the future of South Afri­
can capitalism are not temporary phenomena. 
When the current wave of unrest began late in 
1984, a number of commentators drew parallels 
with the situation after Sharpeville and Soweto: 
A few nervous Whites would leave, the stock 
market dip briefly and some more Blacks would 
get shot until there would be a return to a stable 
equilibrium enforced by the power of the state. 
However, a high and constant level of counter­
violence directed against the state has conti­
nued, with greater pressure being exerted on the 
political system through labour, usually in the 
form of labour confederations of general and 
community unions, flexing its muscles within the
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legal channels opened to them by industrial en­
franchisement.
Abroad, the campaign for disinvestment and di­
vestment continues, and has taken a grip of the 
young and radical elements in Europe and the 
United States in a way that was only paralleled 
by the peace movement. Virtually everyday there 
is news of companies disinvesting or some an­
nouncement of the ‘boycott South African goods 
movement’.
7.11.2 Assumption two : unstable equilibrium 
The second assumption within this scenario is 
that present events within South Africa con­
stitute the beginnings of a new long-term un­
stable equilibrium, such as that obtaining in 
Northern Ireland or Lebanon. Obviously, these 
analogies do not hold in any exact sense -  they 
are simply meant to reinforce the second as­
sumption that social and political relations with­
in South Africa cannot be restored to the status 
quo ante. On the contrary, they are likely to be 
constantly in a state of flux and will probably re­
tain a fair share of unfocused (and more di­
rected) violence, urban disorder, mass struggle, 
state brutality and economic crisis.
Would this and the previous assumption alter 
dramatically if Black rule were attained? A 
major difficulty in assessing such a proposition 
is that there is an uncertainty whether, in a free 
competition for electoral advantage, a clear 
Black and Brown coalition would emerge. There 
is little doubt that a conservative Black party 
under the leadership of a figure like Chief Mang- 
sothu Buthelezi would attract political support 
by a significant section of a Black electorate.
On the other hand, the representative organisa­
tions of the African and Coloured population 
that operated in the 1950s and were banned in 
the 1960s have existed largely in exile for 20 years 
or more. These organisations are split amongst 
themselves, although it is clear that the ANC is
the dominant force. The events of 1976 and 
1984/85 suggest that the historic role of the ANC 
has not been forgotten by current leaders of the 
Black struggle. Many of the symbols and colours 
shown at Black funerals and rallies are declara­
tions of support for this dominant force of the 
liberation movement. The ANC has also ac­
quired a strong presence through underground 
work in the communities, in the trade unions and 
through spectacular acts of sabotage.
However, the main effective internal coalition is 
the United Democratic Front (UDF) which in 
many respects continues the old traditions of 
front and alliance politics established by the 
ANC. It is, however, an organisation with its feet 
closer to the ground, is run by a younger leader­
ship and has proved its worth in popular con­
frontations with the government. (Schlemmer, 
1983: p.73)
Whites have for so many years been conditioned 
to to seeing the exiled ANC as the embodiment 
of evil, that they have found it quite difficult to 
adjust to the fact that their internal opposition 
may represent a more potent threat. After such 
a lengthy period in exile, the attractions of legit­
imacy must be many for the leaders of the ANC, 
but they will have to weigh that option against 
the probable loss of support from the radical 
township youth and the probable backlash of 
White popular opinion.
7.11.3 Assumption three: black majority rule 
The most likely scenario to emerge from the cur­
rent powerful challenge to the state and its in­
creasing openness to political negotiation would 
be for a small opportunist element of the ANC 
to do a deal with the White minority government, 
on the basis of some power sharing arrangement 
in the urban areas, leaving the existing ‘home­
lands’ intact and the power base of the Inkhatha 
Movement inviolate. However, such a partial 
solution is likely to be part of a continuing un-
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stable equilibrium, and in the long run it is like­
ly that the centrist elements of the UDF and the 
mainstream of the ANC will link together once 
the ANC is legalized, or is sufficiently strong to 
operate in open defiance of the government. The 
next, perhaps optimistic, scenario is that a coali­
tion movement representing the the generality of 
African and Coloured interests will inherit pol­
itical power based on a non-racial franchise with 
a minimum degree of violence and electoral 
fraud. Assumption three, therefore, is that 
Black majority rule, if it comes to South Africa, 
will be supported by a broad base of African and 
Coloured South Africans. A corollary to this as­
sumption is that such a movement will have its 
roots inthe Western Cape and will, at least in its 
initial stages, be driven by community and 
general unions. This movement will be crystal­
lized into a political party comprising elements 
of theUDF and the ANC and will be organised 
along socialistic lines. Evidence in support of 
this line of reasoning will be presented hereafter, 
with the hypothetical party referred to as the 
OUR PARTY.
7.11.4 Assumption four: private property & 
collective ownership
It is often assumed that all subordinated groups 
have a self evident class interest which will be 
met by the destruction of apartheid. However, 
African and Coloured South Africans have a 
variety of class interests to protect, maintain or 
defend. One line of fissure is between those with 
a landed rural base and the emergent profes­
sional and petit bourgeoisie in the towns.
Another division of interest is between these 
strata and the broad mass of landless peasants, 
underpaid workers, migrants and the urban un­
employed. These distinctions, which are con­
cealed by the conventional racial form of poli­
tical discourse, are reflected in the many and 
diverse organisations that are loosely held to­
That the ANC is not the monolith it has been 
proclaimed to be can be seen from the public do­
cuments of the Congress movement, including 
the Freedom Charter, compiled at ‘The Congress 
of the Peoples’ in 1955 at Kliptown. Given the 
mythology that accompanies this document, it 
will almost certainly comprise a major plank in 
the political program of the political party whose 
establishment was postulated earlier.
This docum ent wavers betw een private 
property and collective ownership. This heritage 
of a respect for private property (reflecting the 
class interests of the Coloured merchants and 
businessmen as well as the general respectable 
temperament of African Nationalism at that 
time) and the contrary commitment to nationali­
sation (reflecting the influence of the Commun­
ist Party) will remain unresolved. The political 
party postulated earlier will therefore come to 
power with promises like these extracted from 
the 1955 Freedom Charter more or less intact:
.. The mineral wealth beneath the soil, the banks 
and monopoly industry shall be transferred to the 
ownership of the people as a whole. All people 
shall have equal rights to trade where they choose, 
to manufacture and enter all trades, crafts and 
professions.
Restrictions of land ownership on a racial basis 
shall be ended and all the land re-divided amongst 
those who work it, to banish famine and land 
hunger.
Freedom o f movement shall be guaranteed to all 
who work on the land.'” (The Freedom Charter, 
1955.)
7.11.5 Assumption five: neutralism abroad 
The fifth and final assumption is that the foreign 
policy profile and general orientation of OUR 
PARTY would be similar to that established by 
Mugabe in Zimbabwe. This implies a somewhat
gether in the UDF.
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friendlier attitude toward the Soviet Union and 
other countries of the Eastern bloc, an alliance 
with the non-aligned movement, but the re-entry 
of the country into the Commonwealth. These 
broad international re-alignments would be 
more of a facade designed to demonstrate the 
radical credentials of some ex-ANC members 
previously allied to the communist movement.
Trading relationships would continue as normal. 
The giant multi-nationals would continue to run 
the mining houses and the industrial combines. 
The bulk of foreign investment would continue 
to flow from Europe and North America. Gold 
and diamonds would continue to be traded in 
London and South African fruit would still be 
exported to Europe. This last is subject to agri­
cultural production not being too severely dis­
rupted by landgrabbing or increased wages. As 
the new Black bourgeoisie establishes itself 
through state patronage and privileged access to 
public goods, discretionary consumption of im­
ported goods would be maintained at present le­
vels or rise modestly.
7.12 Summary
The usual White assumption that a Black gov­
ernment would signal a collapse into immediate 
disorder is predicated on some exaggerated Af­
rican comparisons. The Congo and Uganda, 
which are normally identified, never had the 
level of skilled personnel, bureaucratic exper­
tise, industrial familiarity, educational attain­
ment to the modern world already found among 
the Black population of South Africa. It is doubt­
ful that the Afrikaners were any better equipped 
to take over the governance of a modern state in 
1948.
The better comparison therefore is not a se­
lected number of other African states, but the 
modern post-colonial states of South-East Asia, 
a number of which have successfully modernized 
their state structures to find a more favourable
It is not foreseen that OUR PARTY will pursue 
a particularly liberal democratic model of gov­
ernment. There will be serious threats to the new 
order from last ditch stands by Whites, from con­
servative African groupings loyal to conservative 
tribal entities, and from unemployed and under­
employed Black youths frustrated when ‘free­
dom’ brings them little.
Above all, the OUR PARTY government will 
be faced with the problem of uncontrolled squat­
ting. The apartheid state is faced by mass remo­
vals -  a policy that will be difficult to sustain in 
view of the constellation of political forces be­
hind the projected government. But it will cer­
tainly have to evolve an urban management 
strategy, perhaps combining the elements of 
self-help with site and service schemes, to cope 
with the uncontrolled movements of people 
compelled by the existing impoverishment of ag­
riculture to search for survival in the urban and 
industrial areas.
Will the assumption of a Black majority govern­
ment in South Africa necessarily mean the end 
of apartheid? Gaining control of the instruments 
of state power is important and can be a means 
for social mobilisation and regeneration: no bet­
ter example can be found than the rate of social 
mobility achieved by Afrikaners within the post- 
1948 South African state.
The achievement of state power does not, how­
ever, dislodge imbedded social structures, or 
alter the ‘economic facts of life’. In South Africa, 
the achievement of Black majority rule would 
not signify the end of apartheid, but its legal and 
formal abolition. The Freedom Charter states 
“.. .All apartheid laws and practices shall be set 
aside” -  the first is easy to achieve by proclama­
tion, but the heritage of apartheid practices will 
not be so easy to root out and destroy.
postion in the modern division of labour.
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8. THE OUTLOOK FOR COLOURED 
LABOUR RELATIONS IN THE CAPE
8.1 Introduction
A scenario of a post-apartheid South Africa has 
been sketched central to which was the postula­
tion of an Africanised political party (the OUR 
PARTY) under the assumption of Black ma­
jority rule. A corollary to this assumption was 
that this party would have its roots in the West­
ern Cape and that organized labour in the Cape 
would be instrumental in its formation. Since the 
Coloureds comprise 12,1% of the national popu­
lation and 80% of them live and work in the 
Cape, it follows therefore that they would be in­
timately involved in the formation of such a 
party. (Race Relations Survey, 1985: p.l) His­
torical and present trends in the development of 
a political direction and identity for the Colour­
eds as well as the pressures exerted from the in­
dustrial relations system will be considered in 
support of this postulate.
8.2 Historical perspective of coloured political 
development
The impact of organised Coloured politics has 
been greater than their minority status would 
suggest, especially in the Cape. When Coloured 
political mobilization on a substantial scale took 
off in the late 1890s, it centered in Cape Town. 
The founding of the first successful Coloured 
political movement in 1902, The African Politi­
cal Organization in Cape Town, in 1902 marked 
the start of successful Black political mobiliza­
tion on a national scale in South Africa. Preced­
ing the African National Congress (ANC) by a 
decade, the APO had more than 20 000 mem­
bers distributed in over 100 branches country­
wide. (Marais, 1939: p.257) Not only did the 
APO play a pioneering role in Black protest 
politics, but it dwarfed the better-known ANC, 
at least until the 1940s. Also, the other Coloured 
organizations which later emerged out of, or in 
opposition to,the APO, made important con­
tributions to the tactics and ideologies of Black 
political leaders. In the early 1940s, Coloured in­
tellectuals propagated the principle of non-col­
laboration with segregatory political institutions, 
implemented through the tactic of the boycott, a 
strategy employed to considerable effect by con­
temporary Black organisations.
The major difference between Coloured and Af­
rican politics, and a major dynamic of Coloured 
politics, was the complex nature of the Coloured 
people themselves. Given the heterogeneous na­
ture and diverse origins of people known as Col­
oureds, they had no separate culture, history, 
language, and in most cases, religion or even 
racial origin from those of Whites. Indeed, the 
frequency with which Coloureds ‘passed for 
Whites meant that many Whites were Colour­
eds. Where the Coloured political leaders of the 
pre-1948 era differed was how best to mobilise 
Coloureds as a group to achieve the kind of 
equality they desired. On the one hand, there 
were those such as Abdurahaman who regarded 
Coloured identity as an instrumental concept, a 
tool to mobilised Coloureds so as to achieve the 
ultimate aim of a non-racial South Africa, 
whether based on a system of equal rights for all 
‘civilised men, or on universal suffrage. On the 
other, there were rhose, notably in the African 
National Bond who accepted the concept of Col­
oured as a distinct ‘ethnic’ o r1racial’ group. None 
of them ever convincingly explained those 
qualities that were intrinsically ‘Coloured'.
Coloured political organisations had a great deal 
in common. For one thing, their leaders were 
drawn from a very small and homogeneous 
group, the upper strata of their societies. Col­
oured political leaders, as a self proclaimed Col­
oured intelligensia, constituted a small and 
tightly knit class. As such, they claimed to speak 
on behalf of all Coloureds, with a patronising at­
titude clarly revealed by Abdurahman’s advo­
cacy of prohibition for Coloureds of by Kies’
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claims for the leading role of the Black intel- 
ligensia in the national liberatory movement. 
The majority of the Coloured political leaders 
were drawn from the upper echelons of the Col­
oured community. For the most part, the ma­
jority of the Coloureds -  the rural and urban 
underclasses -  remained outside Coloured pol­
itical organiastions. This is not tosay that they 
were unaffected by them. The NLL membership 
list reveals that a sizable number of unskilled la­
bourers were members. (Sun, 21 November, 
1941) The upper strata of the Coloured com­
munity saw themselves, and were perceived by 
others as an elite.
Elite status was conferred by a number of factors 
-  occupational, social, religious, and sometimes, 
skin colour. It was on these elites that Coloured 
political organisations and to a large extent, Col­
oured politics, depended, since Coloured politcs 
was elite politics, an attempt to defend, and if 
possible, to advance their positions of relative 
privilege.
These considerations help to explain the 
strength of moderation or even conservatism in 
organised Coloured politics before 1948. At­
tempts to radicalise the elite failed. It had privi­
leges and property to lose in the event of any 
radical restructuring of South Africa. Even the 
working class Coloured was exemt from many 
restrictions place on Africans -  the Pass Laws 
being a case in point. Accordingly, Coloured 
radicals found it increasingly difficult to con­
vince Coloureds to commit themselves to Black 
unity and to confrontationist of non-collabora­
tionist policies. Added to this was the fact that 
Coloureds had more in common, culturally, with 
Whites, than they had with Africans.
The elitist attitude blinded them to their own 
elite status and concerns which separated them 
from the Coloured working class. They were un­
able to involve themselves in practical grassroots
organisation and were unwilling to face the sheer 
hard slow work needed to attract grassroots sup­
port. The 1948 general election completed the 
fragmentation of Coloured politics. The apart­
heid legislation introduced from this year on­
wards systematically and methodically “ . .. cut 
off every avenue o f black middle-class privilege.” 
(Gerhardt, 1978: p.110) For Coloured politics, 
therefore, the post-1948 era was marked by a 
growing convergence of interests with African 
and Indian organisations. This, together with the 
arbitrary and often offensive definitions of cer­
tain people as Coloured in terms of the Popula­
tion Registration Act, and the disfranchisement 
of Coloured voters in the 50s and 60s made pure­
ly Coloured political organisations and political 
activity increasingly less relevant to many of 
those categorised as Coloured.
8.3 The 1964 to 1977 period
The state crackdown of the early 1960s, together 
with a growing array of security legislation, ef­
fectively crushed militant Black political organi­
sations for the rest of the decade. Coloured 
political organisations were in no position to 
mount an effective protest against these 
measures. A new phenomenon- political parties 
-  arose within Coloured politics during the 1960s 
with the formation of the Federal Coloured 
People’s Party (FCCP) which supported apart­
heid and which hoped to protect and advance 
Coloureds rights through loyal and public sup­
port for the ruling White National Party. (Hugo, 
1978: pp 111-118) The rival Labour Party was 
formed in response to it in 1966 since it was 
feared that the FCCP would be seen to be rep­
resenting Coloured majority opinion by default. 
It portrayed itself as a workers party and placed 
itself within the mainstream of past Coloured 
political organisations, revealing a combination 
of principled opposition to segregation and a 
pragmatic willingness to work within the system 
for incremental reform towards its ultimate
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goals. (Van der Ross, 1976: p 428) Despite the 
far-reaching conclutions of the Theron Com­
mission of Enquiry into the Coloured People, it 
took the wave of urban Black unrest of 1976 to 
cause it to review its uncompromising stand to­
ward the Coloured people. The scale of intens­
ity of the mass school boycotts, demonstrations 
and work stayaways which characterised the re­
volt of the Black youth in 1976 transformed the 
nature of Black opposition politics.
In the Western Cape, the children of the rising 
urban Coloured middle classes came to play a 
prominent role in the unrest. They were too well 
aware of their poor education facilities and the 
limitations apartheid had placed on their social, 
political and economic development. Measures 
such as the Group Areas Act had affected them 
and their families directly. In addition, since 
1948, the steady erosion of the Coloured elite’s 
position of relative privilege had reduced the 
material incentives for a separate Coloured 
identity, and encouraged a feeling of shared op­
pression with other Blacks. Manipulations of ar­
tificially imposed ’ethnic’ identities in the 
interest of White domination further encour­
aged a conscious rejection of any separate Col­
oured identity. Hence the substantial degree of 
unity of interests and action amongst Coloured 
and African youth in the 1976 uprisings.
The 1976 unrest, with its politicising and mobi­
lizing effects, marked the start of the revival of 
Black protest politics and political organisations 
on a scale not seen since the 1950s. (Gerhardt, 
1978: p.312)
For the established Coloured political parties 
and organisations, the youth uprising left them 
more isolated than before from the mainstream 
of Black political activity. Negative reactions by 
teachers to Black Consciousness as a racist and 
reactionary ideology caused support for tea­
chers associations such as the CTPA to dwindle
and because they openly expressed grave reser­
vations about the school boycotts. The Labour 
Party (LP), although it retained a significant the 
support of a significant part of the adult com­
munity, found itself losing support amongst the 
youth and increasingly isolated in its advocacy of 
working within government-created institutions 
for reform. (Hugo, 1987: p.260)
8.4 1980 Onwards
Many Black leaders rejected the tricameral sys­
tem and the African local government reforms 
as an attempt by the government to modernize 
and entrench, rather than abolish, apartheid. In 
1983, the United Democratic Front (UDF) was 
formed as a loose coalition of broadly like- 
minded interest groups, rather than tightly knit 
and ideologically uniform political bodies. The 
UDF tends to follow Charterist lines, and 
stresses non-racialism, actively soliciting White 
support. It also emphasizes the “. .. primacy of 
the working class in the national democratic 
struggle”, but displays greater ambiguity on the 
issue of the desirability of socialist alternatives. 
(Barrel, 1984: pp 7-9, pp 11-12)
The emerging Black trade union movement, 
even more significant than the UDF in terms of 
committed direct grassroots support and of co­
hesive organisation and industrial muscle, 
preferred for the most part to remain apart from 
the UDF and to preserve its freedom of action. 
The new trade union federations find themselves 
perforce involved in ‘poliliaT issues to an in­
creasing extend and act as levers of increasing 
pressure on Government and white business to 
accommodate change.
In summary then, despit their growing militancy, 
the older themes of non-racialism and non-vi­
olence persist in the mainstream of Black poli­
tics, although they are under increasing pressure 
as society polarizes. For the most part, organisa­
tions such as the UDF rely on the politics of
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pressure, rather than those of revolution. At the 
local level, community leaders use campaigns 
such as school stayaways, work stayaways and 
boycott tactics for payment of rents, or pressure 
on White businesses to attempt to force local 
White authorities and business to concede to 
their demands.
Since 1948, for all the reasons listed before, the 
relevance of Coloured political organisations 
has declined and mainstream Coloured politics 
has become subsumed within the broader Black 
political movements. Any attempt at a separate 
Coloured identity has been rejected.
Since 1900, the contributions of specifically Col­
oured political organisations have been felt in 
the organisational structures, ideologies and 
strategies of the whole range of Black political 
movements, whether the ANC of 1912 or the 
UDF of today, the predominance of strategies 
on non-collaboration, the use of the boycott tac­
tic and the major roles of Coloured intellectuals 
and leaders in South African Black politics today 
underscore the importance of this contribution.
Despite the contemporary prevalence of non­
collaborationist policies, however, the experi­
ence of Black politics generally vindicated the 
politics of negotiation combined with effective 
pressure rather than those of principled with­
drawal as advocated by the New Unity Move­
ment (NUM). (New Unity Movement, April 
1985) The key to mass support and effective 
pressure for change lies with detailed attention 
and close responsiveness to grassroots member­
ship, and with specific and disciplined cam­
paigns using effective pressure tactics to achieve 
attainable goals.
8.5 The future of coloured labour relations
The historical and current trends identified ear­
lier have implicitly laid the basis in fact for sup­
port of Bendix1s contention of the non-racial 
labour movement and its attraction for the Col­
oured labour force and their collective aspira­
tions. (Bendix, 1985: IR Texts, p.23) The non- 
racial labour movement holds that the primary- 
polarization should not be between workers, but 
between workers and employers. A worker’s 
basic position in the Capital-Labour dichotomy 
is what counts, not his race. His relationship to 
management as a dependent wage earner and 
his status as a worker are the other criteria con­
sidered important. A solution to the South Afri­
can industrial relations problem is, therefore, 
not seen in multi-racial and group-interest 
terms, but as a complete non-racial and individ­
ual industrial enfranchisement. Carried through 
to its logical conclusion on the political plane, it 
expresses itself in a general enfranchisement on 
a one man one vote basis and ultimately within 
the central assumption of Black majority rule in 
our earlier scenario for South Africa.
In socio-economic terms it is, therefore, possible 
to compare the position of Coloured labour with 
that of its British and European counterparts at 
approximately the turn of the century. This as­
sumes that the colour issue in political terms is 
ignored for the present.
Developments there favoured the development 
of a ‘Labour Party’’ and Bendix (1985:1 R Texts, 
p.17) is of the opinion that the non racial labour 
movement in terms of political aspirations will 
transmute itself into ‘labour party’ affiliations. 
He further contends that this non-racial move­
ment will become the major platform of Col­
oured aspirations in economic terms and that it 
will transmit it itself into community-centered 
pressure group politics and into increased la­
bour activity on the industrial front.
8.6 Summary
The Western Cape has as yet been relatively un­
touched by recent developments in the new la­
bour dispensation and, if the newer unions are 
able to succeed in establishing strong shop floor
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organisation, they may yet come to play a role in 
labour relations in the area and may, at the same 
time, discard their overtly political image. (Ben­
dix, 1985: I  R Journal, p.46)
Given the aforegoing themes and events, it is 
possible to conclude that the Western Cape 
would be the first to enter a labour relations situ­
ation different to that of the rest of the country 
and more similar to the left-right position in 
traditional European Capital-Labour terms.
8.7 Conclusion
The socialist working class party is the most fre­
quent to have mass membership and all socialist 
parties that have become major political forces 
have mass memberships. Good reason for this 
organisational character is that the only way a 
movement that challenged the existing economic 
order could seriously compete politically would 
be for it to organise many of the class in whose 
name and interests the challenge was being ad­
vanced. Patronage, even if customarily available, 
would be too inaccessible to provide an organi­
sational basis for a movement originating out­
side the orthodox political system, and 
capitalists would be unlikely sources of funds. 
The organisational problem is entirely analo­
gous to that of trade unions, hence the conten­
tion that such a movement in South Africa would 
have its roots within the Black Trade Union 
movement. Only in large numbers can there be 
strength. Dues cannot be too high and so must 
come from many rather than few. And numer­
ous workers are also necessary to reach the still 
more numerous whose votes are needed. The 
proletariat, as Michaels (1949: p. 46) has ob­
served in his early studies of socialist parties, 
needs to organise in order to exert strength.
Two obvious prerequisites for a socialist work­
ing class party are a sizable industrial working 
class and the felt need of that class to organise 
politically, as well as industrially, in its own in­
terests. A popular Marxist view espoused by 
Lorwin was that with time, a requisite class con­
sciousness would develop. Nations late to indus­
trialise would be late to develop class-conscious 
parties. (Lorwin,1958: p.350) However, after a 
century of industrial development in the West­
ern World, the Marxian view is unsupported 
since it fails to account for the absence of a so­
cialist party in the largest industrial nation, the 
United States, and for the apparently arrested 
state of growth of socialist parties in the most 
fully industrialised European nations. It is now 
possible to argue that the socialist working class 
party is a product of a fairly early stage of indus­
trialisation and of industrialisation in specifically 
European socio-historical circumstances. Ep­
stein is of the opinion that large membership 
working class parties are a product of circum­
stances and occur only at certain stages of social 
development in certain nations, that these cir­
cumstances maybe receding, and therefore a so­
cialist working class party is not the inevitable 
wave of the future in every advanced nation. 
(Epstein, 1967: p.132)
What can be said generally of Europe is that its 
pre-modern, feudal past made for a pervasive 
consciousness of class before the development 
of industrial society. While it may have been 
equally true for Britain as for the rest of Europe, 
it is possible to believe that the effects were 
modified by other aspects of British Society. Re- 
inhard Bendix (October, 1961: p.l 15) has sug­
gested that the continental working class had no 
sense of recognized position in the civic com­
munity in which to participate. Britain’s indus­
trial working class was created in a political 
culture long based on class distinctions. Indus­
trial workers were a new class in an old class so­
ciety. They were socially and politically unequal 
to begin with. Most of them had first been un­
equal as peasants. Being underprivileged econ­
omically had always meant being under­
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privileged socially and politically.
Only the nature of the new employment and the 
new urban life meant that organisation became 
a possiblity and this was fostered by the subcul­
ture of the urban proletariat. It was natural for 
workers to think of themselves as a class, virtualy 
a nation, apart from the rest of the nation.
A particular residue of pre-modern Europe was 
the persistence of political inequality in the re­
stricted franchise. Almost everywhere in Eu­
rope, industrialization  came before the 
franchise was extended to the workers and the 
mass of the population. The working classes 
existed before they had the right to vote. In Bri­
tain, the rise of the Labour Party at the turn of 
the century serves to illustrate the parallels with­
in the developing Western Cape and South Af­
rican labour situation and the situation as it 
existed then. It arose in an old class/racial so­
ciety. The working class had only recently been 
enfranchised, at least industrially, and it stood 
far apart from the governing class-economically, 
politically, socially and educationally. To an 
extra-ordinary degree, political power had long 
been the monopoly of those raised in privileged 
circumstances. While initial guidance and ideo­
logical direction came from middle class intel­
lectuals, the real leaders of the party were and 
have been working class men.
The hypothesis of Beer that the Labour party is 
a coalition of many interests and points of view 
would find ready acceptance in its South African 
context if one considers the disparate elements 
within the UDF and their political leanings. He 
postulates that a similar coalition can emerge 
from within the UDF. (Beer, 1969) If this plu­
ralist point of view is followed, the Labour Party 
may, therefore, be thought of as a coalition that 
includes various groups, such as trade unions 
and reformers with special concerns, each com­
ponent group aiming at its particular goal. In
this coalition, the socialists are nothing more 
than a member. The Labour Party, writes Ber­
nard Crick, “.. . is a coalition of diverse class, 
union, regional ideological even ethnic interests..
. And socialism itself, except in a very broad sense, 
is only one element in this coalition... certainly 
subsidiary.” (Crick, 10 December 1960 : p.453) 
Continuing the pluralist line of thought, ideology 
or social philosophy is, therefore, unlikely to play 
a major role as a bond of unity in a party and as 
a source of program and policy. The origin of 
party policy is likely to be found in the wishes of 
ordinary voters and members. These wishes, de­
mands or goals orginate in and are shared by 
members of groups and the initiative will come 
from groups.
The history of Coloured politics reveals a strik­
ing continued commitment to the principles on 
non-racialism, non-violence, and democracy, 
despite severe testing from White governments 
which not infrequently ignored all three in their 
dealings with Blacks and in fact often trans­
formed policies formulated for the latter for dif­
fering conditions to the former when they did not 
apply. It bears testimony to the survival against 
great odds of the will to resist, but without re­
sorting to the temptations of blind hatred and 
total rejection. Whether this has proved to be 
more or less effective than revolutionary cathar­
sis is beside the point.
What is clear is that mainstream Coloured 
leaders and organisations not only based their 
strategies on an appreciation of their material in­
terests, or on a realistic appraisal of their limited 
powers as opposed to those of the state, but also 
on the principles of morality and tolerance, 
whether those of Christianity or of the secular 
creeds of Cape liberalism, democracy and anti­
racism.
The twentieth century in South Africa has seen 
a wastage of talents, intellects and goodwill, as a
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direct consequence of the exclusion and rejec­
tion of Black leaders and their organisations 
under the policies of segregation and apartheid, 
on a scale which no country, let alone one so 
divided, can afford without lasting damage to its 
future prospects.
It is, therefore, for the reasons stated earlier that 
the Coloured people are most likely to find a pol­
itical home and group identity within the coali­
tion of interests that has generically been 
referred to throughout as the OUR PARTY.
It will, too, provide a home for the disparate 
groupings of varying political persuasions cur­
rently grouped under the banner of the UDF and 
provide coherence and legality to the overtly 
leftist political leanings of the Black trade union 
movement.
Should the assumptions expressed earlier hold 
good, then it is expected that a national unicam­
eral legislative assembly will emerge, perhaps 
with protected seats in the short term for the 
Coloured, Indian and White minorities. Local 
government, particularly in the townships, 
would become more representative and more 
responsive to local needs. It is doubtful as to 
whether the level of Black electoral support 
would be very high in the first election and the 
level of effective White representation in the 
central government is, therefore, likely to be
higher than their proportion in the population 
would merit.
Within the Western Cape, it could be expected 
that member organisations of the UDF which 
have solid roots within the community will domi­
nate local governement. From this foundation, 
the coalition of interests referred to as the OUR 
PARTY will contest at a national level for rep­
resentation within the central government. This 
assumes that the Coloured people will play a 
major role within this coalition, given their his­
torical precedents. The role of Labour here 
would be to give support to the coalition in re­
turn or safeguards for its position within society. 
Implicit in this is the conviction that White mi­
nority rule in South Africa cannot survive. How­
ever, Black control of the instruments of state 
power is important and can be used as a means 
for social mobilisation and regeneration: no bet­
ter example can be found than the extra-ordi­
nary rate of social mobility by Afrikaners within 
the post-1948 South African state.
The achievement of state power does not, how­
ever, dislodge imbedded social structures or 
alter the economic 'facts o f life.’ The achieve­
ment of Black majority signifies the legal and for­
mal abolition of apartheid, not its end. The 
heritages of apartheid practices will not be so 
easy to root out and destroy.
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